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 2 
Summary 
Our paper looks at account manipulation in private companies purchased and sold by private 
equity funds. We use a proxy for discretionary accrual earnings management to measure the 
degree of manipulation in accounting data, comparing the estimates with companies from the 
same industry and year. An estimate for nondiscretionary accrual earnings management is 
calculated using the modified- jones model, discretionary accrual is then assumed to be all 
parts of the total accrual earnings management not described by the nondiscretionary 
estimate. We have two separate datasets, one containing purchased portfolio companies and 
their comparable companies. The other dataset contains portfolio companies sold by private 
equity funds and their comparable companies. Information about equity transactions comes 
from the argentum research database and account information from each individual company 
comes from the SNF database (Norges Handelshøyskole and Samfunns- og 
næringslivsforskning AS 2017). From our proxy estimates we see no statistically significant 
persistence overall years or industries, this indicates there is no separable strategies for 
earnings management in companies owned by private equity funds compared to the market 
usage.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial reporting is a powerful tool, it gives owners data to control the trajectory of the 
company. While also summarizing firms’ financials into comparable reports that investors 
can use to estimate company value. Some freedom is afforded to the accounting party for 
how to portray their firms’ information. This method is called accrual accounting and is 
meant to help firms represent their financial state. However, an issue arises when discretion 
is used to misrepresent financial information. Misusing choices in financial reporting is very 
prevalent, because it is hard to detect and has few ramifications1. Since most of these 
decisions fall within accounting laws there is little risk in utilizing the discretion afforded to 
a company to misrepresent financial reports. There is also little that can be done by external 
or internal parties to deter or supervise account manipulation. Reported accounting data does 
not give a complete picture of every financial decision. 
 
Most research has so far looked at public firms, often for a lack of data on private firms. Yet 
private firms face many of the same issues as public firms. One group of private firms are 
especially vulnerable, namely private equity owned firms. Private Equity based firms are 
frequently sold and interim performance is used by fund managers to raise new funds. In this 
paper we look at two distinct occurrences a company could go through in its lifecycle. We 
use the modified Jones Model to estimate the extent of account manipulation in individual 
firms. By using a sample of comparable companies that are not owned by a private equity 
fund, we can see if fund involvement leads to more or less manipulation.  
 
The first time period we are looking at is before, during and after a private equity firm 
purchases a company. We investigate what happens to a company when they have new 
owners, in particular when those owners are a private equity fund. This question can inform 
us on company behavior before sales and how fund managers handle account manipulation. 
The second time period is before, during and after a private equity firm sells a company. 
                                                 
1 The most well known case of earnings management were done by Enron through the late 1900s. Where they got special 
dispensation by the US government to do evaluate assets based on market prices. The Enron case showcases illegal uses of 
account manipulation that went unchecked for too long, due to the lack of information reported in their accounts. 
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Similar to the other question, it involves transferring ownership stakes for a company. In this 
case we can investigate how fund managers will handle company accounts before selling the 
firm. Also, we can see how owners will react when they receive control of a company 
previously handled by a fund manager. There is an interesting dichotomy between the two 
periods, in one case private sellers are able to mislead the fund to overvalue the company. 
While in the other case, it is the fund that holds the power to manipulate the firms perceived 
value. When and how the different parties use this advantage will be interesting to examine. 
 
The accrual accounting method is a strategy where a company can owe money for purchased 
products, but still report the acquisition of the goods. The choice for which accounting 
method should be implemented comes down to a company’s management. This discretion 
allows management the option to either represent an accurate state of the company or to 
mislead the owners and other interested parties by manipulating the accrual reporting (Teoh, 
Wong and Rao 1998, pp. 175-176). We use the term earnings management when talking 
about the manipulation of accounting data mentioned above. The term earnings management 
has many definitions (Mora 2010), but we will base our paper on the description termed by 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368): 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
 
Earnings management is any manipulation of company accounts done by the firm’s 
management. Creating misleading accounting data to represent a false image of the company 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999, p. 6). The simplest definition only involves manipulation of 
accounting data where manager can choose how to represent the company’s financial state 
through an accrual accounting method. In a broader definition we can also include real 
investment decisions and real financial decisions made to alter reported earnings. The term 
does not include any external leverage the company or any affiliates of the company has on 
legislation or on the internal reporting processes.  
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Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen (1999) divide the motivations for earnings 
management into 3 main areas; capital market motivations, contracting motivations and 
regulatory motivations. Capital market motives refers to the use of earnings management to 
change external evaluations of the company, which influences sales prices for potential 
buyers. Contracting motives is the use of earnings management to meet a requirement or 
incentive set in a contract, these can both be external or internal contracts. Regulatory 
Motivations refer to the use of earnings management to circumvents industry-specific 
regulations and anti-trust regulations, avoiding the requirements made to secure a healthy 
and competitive industry or the requirements that secures the interest of all parties tied to a 
company. 
 
Due to the varied reasoning for earnings management it can be very hard to identify 
instances it is being used. The company’s accounts do not provide enough transparency and 
information to understand the exact intent behind accounting decisions (Kasznik 1999, pp. 
59-60). Earnings managements utility makes it very accessible for companies to use some 
degree of earnings management. This stems from the difference between accounting 
standards and the criteria needed for indisputable accounting (Schipper 1989, pp. 92-93). 
This behavior will over time mean manager have severely over- or undervalued the 
company. Since this is so prevalent, markets will include the assumption that managers are 
manipulating the accounts to reach earnings goals and to better pricing (Stein 1989, pp. 655-
656). 
 
However, an overvalued company can quickly correct their accounts by reporting extreme 
losses. This counteracts all the accounted earnings, Scott (2009, p. 405) refers to this as a big 
bath. These cases also occur in other instances where managers want to meet the 
expectations of the owners to secure a new period as manager or match external evaluations 
of the company. (DeAngelo 1986, p. 4) (Healy and Wahlen 1999, p. 10). Summed up, a 
manager’s intentions are reflected in the earnings management styles they choose. Private 
equity funds with influence over their portfolio companies will for example have a distinct 
strategy compared to individual owners, because they have different intentions with the 
company.  
 
A private equity fund is classified as a temporary pooling of resources from a series of 
investors, with the purpose to invest in long term prospects. The length of an investment 
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varies, but investors have a predetermined timeline for how long a fund can operate. The 
timeline before the fund has to be disbanded is defined in the fund agreement, there are 
possibilities for time extensions in this agreement. To set a date when investments have to be 
liquidated or equity shares has to be handed over to investors sets a limit to the impact a fund 
can have on a portfolio company. In cases where the timeframe is shorter, it would benefit 
the fund managers to use forms of earnings management to portray their involvement in 
portfolio companies in a better light. Inflating the estimated value for the company to 
potential buyers, possibly getting a better return for the investment (Healy and Wahlen 1999) 
 
The two most common categories for private equity funds are venture capital and buyout 
(Cendrowski 2008, pp.4-6). They carry distinct characteristics, as venture capital focuses 
primarily on newly established and growing companies that need resources to expand. While 
buyout mostly focuses on larger and established companies (Cendrowski 2008, p.21). where 
the fund managers can come in and make managerial or structural changes to increase 
profitability. Liquidating the results from an investment can be a difficult task, if stressed the 
exit price might fall underestimate of equity value. The most common ways for a fund to exit 
is either through an initial public offering or through a trade sale to another fund focusing on 
more mature prospects (Cendrowski 2012, p. 69). Private equity funds have a specific goal 
when they enter into a company, reflected in the earnings management decisions they make. 
 
With the trends we see in earnings management and with performance incentives for private 
equity funds, it seems counter intuitive that research indicates involvement with a private 
equity fund will reduce the amount of earnings management in a portfolio company. This is 
especially true in cases where the private equity fund has an existing reputation for being 
reputable (Lee and Masulis 2011). A fund relies on external investors for capital, these 
external investors are interested in increased monitoring. To better gauge their own returns 
and to deter the use of earnings management (Feng 2015, pp. 618-619).  
 
Potential investors rely on private equity funds to reduce the information asymmetry 
between a private company and purchaser. This trust builds on the reputation of the private 
equity fund, which is one of the possible reasons why the PE fund involvement will reduce 
earnings management. Decisions made in a portfolio company under the influence of a fund 
managers will reflect onto the fund, changing the portfolio companies accounting structure 
to be more transparent would for example open up for a greater level of trust from the 
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market. This is theorized to be one of the determining factors for the reduced earnings 
management (Katz 2009, pp. 624-627).  
 
This is especially true when trading within the private industries where transparency is 
relatively low, Trade sales between one private party to another private party would 
therefore rely more on trust. When earnings management is used it can impact the quality of 
information further, any available accounting data can be manipulated by management for 
any of the reasons mentioned above. Since buyers cannot trust the evaluations they use to 
estimate a company’s value, they will need greater incentives to compensate for the added 
risk (Beuselinck, Deloof and Manigart 2009, p. 612) (Healy and Wahlen 1999, p. 8). We 
want to focus on the Norwegian market with its own characteristics, that incentivizes its own 
approaches to earnings management. Especially due to the rapid growth we have seen in the 
private equity market, with  Norwegian and foreign private equity funds investing a total of 
NOK 21,249 million in to Norwegian firms in 2017 (NVCA, s.v. Private Equity Funds in 
Norway – Activity report 2017). This makes the involvement private equity funds have 
in the Norwegian economy interesting to analyze further. Their governance over several 
companies and with their time limited ownership, gives a potential for earnings management. 
For this reason, our research question is formatted as following:   
  
 
Are there any visible effect from Private Equity funds control over a portfolio 
companies’ management in the use of discretionary accruals Earnings 
Management. 
 
  
Our measure for earnings management will be measured by a proxy for nondiscretionary 
accrual earnings management (NDA). Accrual earnings management refers to any 
manipulation in the accounts of a company’s books, representing a distorted version of the 
economic reports (Healy and Wahlen 1999, p. 6). The total sum of accrual earnings 
management is made out of two parts, Discretionary accrual (DA) and NDA earnings 
management. The nondiscretionary forms of accrual earnings management are any revenue 
that has not been actualized but has been accounted for in the books. Discretionary reporting 
refers to accounting data that managers had oversight and input on. A calculated proxy of 
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this value would represent the difference of what was expected in company books and what 
was found. 
 
We divide the research question into one dataset for companies bought by private equity 
funds and one dataset for companies sold by private equity funds. These datasets will contain 
a sequential 5-year period for each portfolio company with the third year being the 
purchase/sales year. We do not have purchase and sales information for all companies, 
because of this the number of observations will vary between datasets. The entry period is 
made out of 217 original treatment observations2 over all industries. Due to a restriction in 
number of observations required to calculate propensity scores, we are only interested in 
industries with several observations spread across several years. This allows us to narrow 
down comparable companies to those in the same industry and in the same year. There are 
only four industries large enough to fit this criterion, which leaves us with 189 treatment 
observations.  
 
We need a benchmark to test whether a measure for earnings management is similar to the 
estimates we have calculate for our portfolio company. The benchmark is made from 
companies found to be comparable with one of the treatment observations, compared on 
industry, accounting year and asset size. Then narrowed down further through propensity 
score matching. For the PSM we need a dependent variable, but the dependent variable we 
use is a proxy for NDA. To find the closest estimate for NDA we first narrow down 
companies based on accounting year, industry and asset size. This removes any extreme or 
unrelated observations, which leaves us with 21,987 control observations. For our exit period 
we have 160 treatment observations over all industries, with 136 of these observations from 
the four large industries. For our entry period this leaves us with 136 treatment observations 
and using the same criteria to narrow down control group 3we, ending up with 10,147 control 
observations. 
 
Through our analysis we have found little to indicate that companies in periods where they 
are being traded between a private equity fund and other private parties use a greater extent 
                                                 
2 Treatment observations have a common denominator that affects them. 
3 A control group is any collection of data not using a specified effect found in the studied group. 
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of earnings management. The involvement of a private equity fund therefore shows no 
decrease or increase the use of earnings management in these two periods. From the results 
we conclude that there is little to no significant effect from a PE ownership on the DA in the 
two periods of interest. This only accounts for DA in the Norwegian private equity market, 
with more resources a more encompassing dataset involving other markets could be 
interesting to study further. Using the same periods, it would also be interesting to research 
the effect of real earnings management on portfolio companies. 
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2. Private Equity 
 
Private Equity (PE) refers to company ownership through privately traded stocks, this allows 
the seller to choose who can purchase the firm. Unlike public equity, where every investor 
has the same rights to purchase stocks. PE firms mainly purchase and sell the privately 
traded types of equity. Resources for the firms’ investments are collected through external 
investors and managed by fund managers. These firms offer long-term investment 
opportunities, where equity stakes are placed under management of the firm as an unquoted 
company with the possibility of high growth. This management model has active ownership 
approach, where they work closely with the portfolio companies’ management to grow the 
company and increase its value (BVCA.co.uk «Private Equity Explained» 2019). The two 
most common strategies PE firms use when investing is called buyout and venture capital, 
but there are also other strategies: mezzanine financing, private investments in public equity 
(PIPEs) and Fund of Fund investments (FOF) (Cendrowski 2008, p. 4). 
 
Private Equity firms (PE firms) form and manage Private Equity Funds (PE Funds). These 
funds are used as a “shared wallet” or as Cendrowski (2008) puts it; a shared vehicle. Where 
private investors can allocate their capital together for shared investments. Consolidating 
resources gives the individual investors greater influence as a coherent group and makes 
them a larger market participant. These PE firms function as managers and are called 
General partners (GP), while the external investors are called Limited Partners (LP). The 
LPs have little influence on the daily management, outside any predefined rules written in 
the fund’s agreement. These LPs are often professional investors from public funds, private 
pension funds, banks, insurance companies or they are “high-net-worth” individuals that all 
contribute with a pre-specified amount of capital (Cendrowski 2008, p.5). Investment 
amount is set by the GPs through a financing round and depending on the funds popularity 
and size there can be multiple financing rounds4.  
                                                 
4 A typical example of the GP/LP relationship is Argentum and the funds they invest in. Argentum is a Norwegian company 
and a large player in the Nordic PE markets, they are seen as a Limited Partner and operate as a Fund of other Funds.  
 13 
 
PE funds are time-limited with a contractually binding lifetime, usually about 8-12 years 
(Cendrowski 2008, pp. 5-6), but in some circumstances this may vary, and the time limit 
could be lower. During this period, it is the GPs responsibility to act as caretakers and 
managers of the Fund’s investments. They have the responsibility for investments, 
management and governance of portfolio companies. When the time limit is up, they are also 
responsible for the divestments. This is the period where different companies in the PE 
fund’s portfolio are exited/sold (Cendrowski 2008, p. 6). The sales process is most 
commonly initiated in the fourth year of the fund’s lifecycle, where there are several exit 
strategies. The most common exit strategies for PE funds are outside sale to a 
strategic/financial buyer, IPO or merger5 (Cendrowski 2008, p. 6). 
 
2.1 Fund Structure 
 
Typically, the PE firms fund managers have the titles General Partners and are the main 
partners of the PE firm. They often have executive titles such as CFO, CEO, COO and CLO 
(Cendrowski 2008, p. 9). Under them are Associates and Junior partners, however there 
have been an increased use of outsourcing to solve their tasks. These tasks involve 
investment due-diligence, operational assessments, exit process, fundraising and more 
(Cendrowski 2008, p. 9).  
                                                 
5 Investing in different PE funds that are managed by other GPs like Northzone, Norvestor, FSN capital, Altor Equity 
Partners and HitecVision Private Equity (Argentum.no «portfolio» 2019). 
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2.2 Fundrising 
 
PE firms use “closed Fund-raising”, a process that need non or few permits (Cendrowski 
2008, p. 10). Which leads them to be more dependent on the firm’s reputation and 
relationships to create interest, so investors will remain interested in investing resources into 
future funds. This creates an incentive for the PE firm to deliver strong results, since any low 
returns could jeopardize interest in future fund raising (Cendrowski 2008, p. 11). Fund 
reputation is always being tested, since LPs use the PE firm’s periodic returns to gage the 
potential of future funds. With a fund-raising cycle around 3-4 years for a new fund, it is 
crucial that their reputation remains good (Cendrowski 2008, pp. 12-13) to retain interest 
from potential investors. 
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2.3 Difference in Funds 
 
The different types of PE firms are related to the type of portfolio companies they invest inn. 
It’s not the market or industry that defines them, but where in the portfolio company’s 
lifecycle6 the investment occurs (Cendrowski 2008, p. 19). 
 
 
 
Within Venture Capital (VC) the investment process happens over different stages. First a 
primary investment at a point where the company is still very young, then more capital can 
be allocated when the portfolio company has matured and meets a specified milestone 
(Cendrowski 2008, p. 21). This type of financing is called staged capital, which helps the 
VC company minimize its downside losses in advance. This also incentivizes the 
entrepreneur to grow the company further, making both parties similarly interested in the 
company’s future. Then the entrepreneur can decide to keep more of his/her shares when 
going through the next financing round (Cendrowski 2008, p. 21). Most companies acquired 
by venture capital firms struggle to grow and reach their milestones, this can be devastating 
for the entrepreneur since he/she still have equity stakes in the company.  
                                                 
6 It is normal to divide a company into four stages, the first stage is the starting face of a company. This is a time where the 
company needs to find its purpose/niche, revenue is low and failure rates are high. The second stage is the growth face, 
where companies are starting to produce revenue and have established themselves in the market. The third stage is the 
maturity face, where the company is well established in the market and the revenue growth is slowing down. The final stage 
is the decline face, where revenue is down and other actors are taking over the companies market shares.   
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Buyout and Leveraged Buyout (BO and LBO) uses some equity and a large portion of debt 
when financing their investments into new portfolio companies (Cendrowski 2008, pp. 21-
22). Buyout firms focuses their investments on more mature companies, in both publicly and 
privately held companies (Cendrowski 2008, p. 21). They find firms that have strong and 
stable cash flows and a low debt-to-equity ratio relative to other comparable companies. 
Because they usually use the cash flow to finance a large portion of the investment and 
through taking on debt and placing it into the acquired company (Cendrowski 2008, p. 21). 
 
2.4 Fund Process 
 
The GP sets a funding target when setting up a new fund, this is the amount of capital the GP 
wants to raise to create the fund. The LPs each commit a portion towards this capital goal but 
waits to invest the resources. Until a GP calls for their total or partial share of capital as they 
start to invest into different portfolio companies. This could happen several times within the 
investment period, which usually lasts for the first four years of the fund’s lifecycle. These 
calls for capital are sometimes scheduled in advanced, making it easier for LPs to plan their 
investments and capital flows (Cendrowski 2008, p. 6).  
  
The sales period, also called the exit period or the divestment period. Is the time when GPs 
realize their returns on the fund’s equity stakes. This may result in some great returns from a 
few companies and some losses in others (Cendrowski 2008, p. 6). Harvesting refers to the 
PE fund selling off their investments to the public through an IPO or to a new corporate 
buyer. This Is how the PE firms realizes their returns on investments, which thereafter is 
distributed to their investors (Cendrowski 2012, p. 69). Some portfolio companies may need 
more financing to get their needed or desired returns. While others can be liquidated faster 
and still get the desired returns on their investment (Cendrowski 2008, p. 6). These decisions 
are closely analyzed knowing that the fund has a pre-defined lifetime schedule, as specified 
in a legal contract between the GPs and LPs in the Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) 
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(Cendrowski 2008, p. 7). In this agreement we have the incentives for the GPs that help to 
align their interests with the LPs interests. The contract also has safety measures for the LPs, 
through defined rules and restrictions for the GPs in their managing of the fund. It can also 
contain the possibility for an extension of the fund’s lifetime. We also have agreements on 
structures for the LPs role and commitment: How funds returns are re-distributed, the GPs 
portion of the profits after divestments and the management fee while operating the fund 
(Cendrowski 2008, p. 7).  
 
Parts if these agreements vary between the different forms of PE firms. Venture Capital 
(VC) often invest in many small companies and therefore have a different administrative 
strategy when managing their fund. With greater total investment costs for doing a larger 
quantity of deals through a fund’s lifetime. Therefore, they need more capital to ensure that 
all deals on their scouted prospects can go through. Since there is a greater focus on 
acquiring companies, it is normal for the management fee to be 2,5 % of the fund’s total 
capital.  While Buyout funds GPs have greater variation in their management fee, depending 
on fund size and strategy. They have a better possibility for more “economy of scale” when 
doing fewer deals, with larger companies’ compared to VC acquisitions (Cendrowski 2008, 
p. 7). The carried interest is the GPs portion of the capital gains on the fund’s investments, 
as a compensation from managing LPs capital is normally set to 20 % of the profits. While 
they also receive an annual management fee at about 2 % of committed capital, for covering 
cost of investing and managing the fund (Cendrowski 2008, p. 63). The carrie incentivizes 
GP to maximize LPs returns, to maximize profits from portfolio company sales (Cendrowski 
2008, p. 8).  
 
There are several reasons to use IPOs as the exit strategy, for one the company receives a 
public-company status7. Which, in general generates a more positive reputation from being 
seen as more stable, transparent and assumed to have had a strong growth (Cendrowski 
2012, pp. 69-70). Another positive angle is that a publicly traded company may have an 
                                                 
7 public-company status refers to the extra transparency and increased interest that comes with companies going public. In 
these cases companies will receive a greater degree of trust from their investors.   
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easier and faster way to raise large amounts of capital. Since they already have public 
information it is less risky to loan them money (Cendrowski 2012, p. 70). It also makes the 
equity ownership more liquid, so stakeholders like entrepreneurs and PE funds can easily sell 
their shares if needed. In some circumstances stocks are given back to the LPs instead of 
cash, this is usually done for at least two reasons: First to maximize the internal rate of 
return8 (IRR) (Cendrowski 2012, p. 70) and secondly the IPO may have a lock-up period9 
which may stop stakeholders from selling their shares within 60 to 360 days after the IPO, 
meant to stabilize the market price after an IPO (Cendrowski 2012, p. 70). The cost of 
exiting through an IPO is large compared to an ordinary trade sale, it may cost up to 10% of 
the capital raised through an IPO. Other costs are more indirect and are associated with laws 
and regulations (Cendrowski 2012, p. 71). A PE fund will often choose to take their portfolio 
company public if they think it will deliver a significant higher return, relative to a trade sale 
(Cendrowski 2012, p. 109). They compare the decision of an IPO up to the portfolio 
company’s attractiveness, cost of transparency, extra cost, advantages with a more liquid 
equity stock and the security law regulations (Cendrowski 2012, p. 109).  
 
The other exit strategy would be to instead exit through a Merger and/or Acquisition, also 
called trade sale. By choosing this exit type, the investors (LP and GP) do not have to wait 
out the lock-up period to calculate and redistribute the returns on their investments 
(Cendrowski 2012, p. 112). The different forms of merger are; forward mergers, where the 
“buyer” pays the target with an equity stake in its firm. Reverse merger, where the “buyer” 
joins and merge into the bought firm (Cendrowski 2012, p. 111). Horizontal takeovers, 
where firms in the same industry join forces formally, through a Merger or Acquisition. 
Vertical takeover, where a firm is bought from someone in their supply chain to become one 
firm controlling a larger part of the supply chain (Cendrowski 2012, p. 112). Strategic 
takeover, done defensively for growth and/ or financial reasons (Cendrowski 2012, p. 112). 
 
                                                 
8 IRR is the minimum rate of return needed for a project or time specific firm restructuring to generate growth in the 
company. 
9 The lock-up period is the time where equity is not allowed be traded.  
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When initiating a sale process for their portfolio company, they start by finding potential 
buyers and then anonymously send out teasers (Cendrowski 2012, p. 116). Here the 
portfolio companies’ historical financial statements are presented, together with a short 
description of the industry and their business plan. Then in the next round, those who have 
showed interest are given a more thorough view of the company’s financials (Cendrowski 
2012, p. 116). The paperwork in front of a sale is extensive, with projections of the future, 
argumentation and validation for why this financial “story” is possible or likely (Cendrowski 
2012, p. 118). When the bids are submitted and all of those who were interested has given 
their offers to the PE firm selling the portfolio company, the more classified information is 
sent out. There will be set up meetings with management teams, then the interested buyers 
will start their deeper and more extensive due diligence of the portfolio company 
(Cendrowski 2012, p. 118). It is in this last process that many strategic buyers often fall out 
of the “auction”, especially if there are many interested parties left and if there are many 
financial buyers left. After this the bidding rounds will take much of the potential profits and 
the sale will then be finalized (Cendrowski 2012, pp. 118-119). 
 
2.5 Norwegian Private Equity 
 
These statistics are develop for the Norwegian Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association (NVCA, s.v. Private Equity Funds in Norway – Activity report 2017). They 
define Norwegian Private Equity as belonging to Norway when: “the advisory team 
responsible for the investment and divestment is located in Norway”, which means that if the 
HQ is in Norway, then they are defined as a Norwegian PE firm. (NVCA, s.v. Private Equity 
Funds in Norway – Activity report 2017). 
 
In total Norwegian PE firms has invested NOK 1,745 million into Venture Capital and NOK 
6,587 million into Buyouts in 2017. The Norwegian PE firms have invested NOK 5,690 
million in Norwegian companies. While foreign PE firms have invested NOK 15,560 million 
into Norwegian companies. Which sums up to a total of NOK 21,249 million invested into 
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Norwegian PE firms in 2017 (NVCA, s.v. Private Equity Funds in Norway – Activity report 
2017). There was in total of 39 Sales and divestments by foreign and Norwegian PE firms 
from Norwegian companies in 2017, 18 if these where trade sales. 15 sales were handled by 
VC firms, which is ten fewer than the year before. 19 where handled by buyout firms, which 
is seven more than the year before. This shows that the Norwegian private equity market is 
active and manages a large sum of capital.  
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3. Earnings Management 
 
Accounting data is meant to represent a company’s financials, acting as a control for internal 
involved parties to understand the position of the company. It also gives information to 
external parties interested due to contractual, legislative or investment interests in the 
company. In an ideal world, all accounting data would perfectly explain the company’s 
position. With no need to make decisions on how they will report different types of 
transactions. However, the criteria that needs to be met for indisputable accounting10 is 
difficult to fulfill (Schipper 1989, pp. 92-93). This allows management to implement their 
own reporting strategies, which opens up for the opportunity to manipulate the accounting 
data to create a misleading image of the company.  
 
The use of these strategies is termed earnings management and involves using accrual 
accounting to manipulate earnings reports. Companies shift cost and/or revenue between 
different accounting years, showing results not representative of the company’s position. 
Earnings management also involves real investment or divestment in the company’s assets to 
help with the currently lacking results. This form is called real earnings management, these 
two strategies represent a total strategy management can use to manipulate financial 
reporting (Roychowdhury 2006, p. 336). For our paper we focus on the usage of accrual 
earnings management in companies.  
 
Scott (2015) names several strategies commonly used in earning management. For periods 
where losses are guaranteed, especially if there are pre-existing reasons for taking a loss in a 
period. The management could account for as much loss as possible in this period, the 
thought being that all amounts of loss will be viewed equally by the owners. This would 
mean future periods have fewer costs to account for. Depending on the extent these losses 
are shifted around, Scott (2009 p. 405) refers to this concept as “Income minimization” or 
                                                 
10 Indisputable accounting refers to financial reporting where there are no choices given to the company on how to represent 
their accounts. 
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“Taking a bath” in more extreme cases. For our case management would use income 
minimization a few years before the sales period. So fewer losses were accounted for in the 
years right before the sale. On the opposite end of the spectrum there is “Income 
maximization” (Scott 2009 p. 405), where revenue is overexaggerated by filling sales that 
have not yet completed. In our case, management would use this form of account 
manipulation in the sales period to represent a higher revenue stream. The most common of 
these patterns is “income smoothening”, which seeks to make period to period accounting 
more stable. This will often entail changing revenue streams or restructuring amortization 
strategies (Scott 2015).  We need to keep these trends in mind while analyzing our data. 
There may be bias introduced by single companies that are going through one of these 
earnings management trends. 
 
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) refer to three different motivations for using accrual earnings 
management, capital market motivation, contracting motivation and regulatory motivation. 
Capital market motivation refers to a company’s wish for higher or lower evaluation. In 
these cases management wants to misrepresent the financial reports to change the perceived 
value of the company. Short-term, this strategy can increase or decrease the sales price of a 
company. Due to the cyclical nature of earnings management the revenue and/or cost 
manipulation will even out and increase/lower valuations over a longer period. This is 
possible due to the lack of external control on company accounts. As long as it remains legal 
accounting it will be very difficult to find proof of earnings management. It is the lack of 
transparency and information that makes it difficult to understand the exact intent behind 
accounting decisions (Kasznik 1999, pp. 59-60).  
 
The second form of motivation for using earnings management focuses on incentives and 
requirements that needs to be met within contracts, these are contractual motivation. There 
are different incentives and contractual obligations tied to most companies, each increasing 
the motivation for a company to use deceitful practices. A common catalyst for earnings 
management is tied to the managements employment contracts, usually there is some form of 
bonus tied to a measure of periodic results for the company. This leads to many managers 
using earnings management to smoothen out results, so they reach the designated number to 
max their bonuses (Kaplan 1985). For a similar effect, if a manager knows they will have a 
loss in a period they could choose to report all available losses for better results in future 
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periods. (Healy 1985 pp. 86-88). Among the different motivations to use earnings 
management, bonus incentives are one of the most widespread reasons. This is why external 
estimates can include the smoothening or income minimization strategies used by managers 
to reach their bonus incentives more frequently (Stein 1989, p. 655). Another form of 
contractual motivation is requirement tied to debt contracts or refinancing.  
 
The final form of motivation for earnings management is regulatory earnings management. 
Which refers to the use of earnings management that circumvents industry-specific 
regulations and anti-trust regulations. Having a small subset of companies controlling the 
majority of market shares in an industry can create anti-competitive behavior. To combat the 
issue, large corporations are limited by how much of the market shares they can consolidate 
through mergers and acquisitions. Regulations meant to limit consolidation and instead 
incentivize competition within an industry is called ani-trust regulation. To combat these 
limitations, corporations can use earnings management to decrease their earnings. With the 
consolidation question mentioned above, an answer for a corporation could be to use a big 
bath to decrease earnings and not break any anti-trust regulation. The other part of the 
regulatory motivations for earnings management is connected to industry specific 
regulations. Here a company could be limited by resource capacities or similar preventative 
measures to safeguard resources11.  
 
This form of accrual-based earnings management can range from legal manipulation, being 
in a grey area to being illegal account reporting. Since total transparency is not a legal 
requirement in these cases like they are in publicly traded stocks. The legality of 
manipulating accounting reports is difficult to pin down. Nevertheless, misrepresentation of 
a company’s accounts to a potential sellers/buyer can occur and can lead to over- or 
underpricing. The new owner must also deal with the rebounding effect to any accrual-based 
earnings management that lead to the acquired company being over or undervalued in the 
first place.  
 
                                                 
11 Norwegian deforestation regulations are one example of regulations meant to limit the use of resources. 
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We separate accrual-based earnings management into discretionary accrual (DA) and NDA. 
Management does not have control over NDA, as they are either mandated by law or 
necessary for the daily drift. On the other hand, DA allows managers to affect the outcome 
period to period. However, DA is hard to measure directly since there are no correct way to 
do accrual accounting. In the case of a Private Equity (PE) firm, the reputation a PE firm will 
affect to what extent they are willing to manipulate the accounting data. Katz (2009, pp. 624-
627) believe this comes down to funds needing to maintain a good repour with their 
customers so that future funds will have the same level of interest among investors.  
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4.  Method 
 
The Earnings Management models Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995, p. 207) explore in 
their research paper has similarities in how they approach finding discretionary accrual 
(DA). All models use the same measure for total accruals (TA) to estimate earnings 
management. The value is meant to represent all changes that was caused by accrual account 
manipulation. The gap between reported earnings and operational cashflows represent the 
total amount of earnings lost or gained thorough accounting policies or other forms of 
account manipulation (Healy 1985, p. 94). However, there is empirical evidence indicating 
that normally we would see negative estimates for TA in a given period. This is partly due to 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) normally being negative by nature (Deangelo 1986, p.409). 
We will get better depiction of the measure by looking at period to period changes. One side-
effect of formatting the TA formula as a period measure, is that the NDA measure is close to 
zero. NDA generally do not change period to period. In these cases, accounting data cannot 
be affected by management and will therefore be less susceptible to external and internal 
variation.    are not reported on the discretion of management and there are instead other 
deciding factors.  
 
We calculate TA earnings management by using the formula developed by Paul M. Healy 
(Healy 1985, p. 94). Displayed bellow is the reformatted version used by Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995, p. 207) for their research into earnings management. In the model we refer 
to total accrual earnings management as TA, while Assets_last_year refer to reported total 
assets from the previous accounting year. The formula uses 6 separate factors, 5 of the 
factors representing the difference in reported earnings operations and operational cashflows 
scaled to the company’s assets. In the model below we use variable names to refer to the 
different values used in the estimate, where: CA refers to current assets, CL refers to current 
liabilities, payable tax refers to payable tax, STD refers to short term debt and DEP refers to 
depreciation and amortization in assets. The sixth factor scales the formula by the company’s 
asset size, to create a more comparable measurement for different sized companies. 
Descriptions of all variables used in the process of estimating DA can be found in appendix 
V. “Δ” Signifies that the value is calculated from the difference of two values. In the case of 
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these time periods we use current accounting year minus the previous accounting year. This 
will also be true for every formula used in the paper. 
 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
 
 
 
The next step in calculating AEM is to find the model that best explain the NDA. Which 
represents accrual earnings management that is not made under the management’s discretion. 
As the understanding for AEM grows, new models are developed to better estimate NDA. 
The first model to estimate NDA was the Healy Model, it uses data from every period to 
calculate an average over time. This approach can more effectively use larger datasets, while 
also accounting for earnings management over multiple time periods. Different groups of 
companies are created from the different motivations and incentives managers have to use 
distinct degrees of earnings management. The average from each dataset is used to create 
comparable values that analysts can compare to the accuracy of the estimates. As we can see 
from the depicted Healy Model bellow, we divide TA over all periods from one dataset with 
the number of periods used (Healy 1985) (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995, p. 197). The 
DeAngelo Model makes the assumption that periodic differences in TA will only calculate 
changes in DA. A change in TA over two subsequent periods will therefore be an estimate 
for DA. This assumption is still used in modern AEM research to a degree. (DeAngelo 1986) 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995, p. 198).  
 
The Jones Model moves away from the assumption that NDA will be constant over time. 
Instead the model estimates change in a firm's economic circumstances, to find what accrual 
decisions where not made on the discretion of the management. Instead of using the multiple 
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time periods we saw in the previous models, the Jones Model will focus on individual years 
(Jones 1991) (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995, pp. 198-199). This makes it a great tool 
for event studies12 or other research that focuses on particular time periods. The industry 
model will similarly to the DeAngelo Model remove NDA. In this case the mean is not over 
directional earnings management, the model will instead use a mean over industries. The 
model assumes that NDA is similar over an industry (Dechow and Sloan 1991, pp. 199-200). 
This research was part of our reasoning when we decided to split companies into groups 
based on their industries.  
 
The Healy Model 
 
  
The DeAngelo Model   
 
  
The Jones Model 
 
  
The Industry Model 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Event studies asses the impact of an event on a target firm. 
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4.1 Modified Jones-Model 
 
As mentioned earlier we cannot produce an exact measure for DA. This is why several 
models have been developed to create estimates, using different assumptions around accrual 
earnings management. This is why the final product is defined as a proxy for discretionary 
accrual in the literature. The most commonly used formula is the modified Jones-Model, 
which uses 3 variables to estimate the model for NDA. Since DA and NDA should give us 
TA. What cannot be explained by NDA with a dependent variable TA, will be an estimate 
for DA. In other words, we try to estimate the TA using a model meant to find NDA. Any 
residual that could not be explained through the model is therefore account manipulation 
done with DA accounting. The first factor in the modified Jones-Model is a measure of 
company size, in the formula the second measure the changes in net revenue (REV) except 
for changes in receivables (REC). The final factor is gross property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) for the company. These three factors use three values in addition to the previous year 
reported assets; REC referring to money owed company, REV referring to operational 
revenue13 and PPE referring to long term/fixed assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Operating revenue is all revenue from the company's primary business. 
 29 
 
    
    
    
   
1.  
2.  
3.  
 
 
 
If we try to estimate the previously calculated TA based on the regression for NDA, the error 
between the predicted value and the TA estimate will produce a DA proxy. Both in the NDA 
formula and the complete formula bellow Assets_last_year has been shortened to At-1. While 
ε refers to the previously mentioned error rate, that estimates the DA.  
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5. Hypothesis 
 
We are investigating the following research question: Are there any visible effect from 
Private Equity funds control over a portfolio companies’ management in the use of 
discretionary accruals Earnings Management.  
 
To better answer the question, we form two hypotheses, separated by two different periods in 
a firm’s life cycle. We use a statistical model to find discretionary accrual Earnings 
Management (DA) and choose to separate the data to remove bias. With the intention that 
this will make our research more robust. The first period involves private equity (PE) funds 
purchasing shares in a company and the second period is the sale of company shares from a 
fund. Previous research has found that PE firms incentivizes a better quality of financial 
reporting after the fund’s entry (Beuselinck, Deloof and Manigart 2009, p. 612). This study 
was from the Belgium PE market, while we are more interested in investigating Norwegian 
based companies. To test this for our Norwegian Portfolio firms we will formulate our first 
hypothesis to focus on the entry period, when the fund is investing into portfolio companies. 
 
H1: PE Portfolio Companies’ discretionary AEM decreases in the entry period, relative to 
comparable companies. 
 
The second hypothesis focuses on the divestment period, this is the time where PE investors 
sell their portfolio companies. There is research indicating that managers overstate earnings 
before selling, to get the investors optimistic about the company’s future (Welch, Teoh and 
Wong 1995, p 64).  While other papers on ownership by PE firms show that they have a 
disciplinary effect on their portfolio companies, increasing the quality in financial reporting 
similar to what was mentioned for hypothesis 1. Results oriented thinking would motivate 
them to inflate earnings and get higher values when divesting. However, as we mentioned 
above there is research that indicates they would rather give an accurate depiction of the 
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company’s financials. One reason for this is the PE markets reliance on repeated business. 
Their reputation is a safety measure for future investments and divestments if one fund does 
poorly (Cendrowski 2008).  The second question we will investigate, will therefore involve 
the effect PE has on managers use of DA in an exit period. 
 
H2: PE Portfolio Companies’ discretionary AEM decreases in the exit period, relative 
to comparable companies. 
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6. Data 
 
We received excel sheets from the Argentum Centre for Private Equity (PE) at NHH. It 
contained information on investments and divestments of PE backed portfolio companies, 
located in the Nordics/northern Europe. This was the basis for our dataset, we then reworked 
it to include the correct accounting data. The accounting data was retrieved from the SNF 
and was initially divided into years, we picked out accounting years relevant to the entry and 
exit years (Norges Handelshøyskole and Samfunns- og næringslivsforskning AS 2017). 
Since we are only interested in the entry and Exit period in the Norwegian PE backed 
portfolio companies, we removed those companies missing a Norwegian organizational 
number.  
 
6.1 Data Process 
 
We constructed two datasets, one made out of all relevant companies exiting a PE portfolio 
and one made out of all companies entering a PE portfolio. The two datasets use the 
combination of organization number and entry/exit year to identify individual observations. 
We made sure each sale/purchase was unique and removed duplicate observations where 
more than one PE fund had entered/exited the company. The Argentum dataset would 
contain all funds entering/exiting a company during the purchase/sale. We were only 
interested in how the changes in ownership affected accrual earnings management and did 
not need to know who or how many changes in ownership happened simultaneously. That is 
why we only kept one company (chosen at random) from each purchase/sales period of a 
portfolio company. This could be an interesting point to look further into in a future paper. 
We only kept accounting data we would either use for future matching or for the analysis. 
Then we did a last check for companies who did not have a specified exit or entry year and 
removed them. This left us with a dataset of 341 unique portfolio companies with an exit 
date and 515 unique portfolio companies with an entry date.  
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The unique observations could through the organization number and the entry/exit year find 
financial reports from the SNF database (Norges Handelshøyskole and Samfunns- og 
næringslivsforskning AS 2017). SNF is a collection of yearly financial reports made by all 
Norwegian companies. The database consisted of several DTA14 files, with each accounting 
year separated into its own dataset. When we read the data into our statistical analysis 
program, we merged all accounting years. Creating a complete dataset with the full financial 
history of all companies that has delivered their financial reports between 1992 to 2016. We 
also link all companies up to their industry, using another DTA file containing bransjeinfo 
from all Norwegian companies. bransjeinfo translates to “industry info” and defines what 
industry a company belongs to, by using a numeric system. This approach made it easier to 
link up information we needed to our chosen portfolio companies and made it easy to edit 
the data further down the line. The large dataset containing all Norwegian companies, would 
also be used to pick out our comparable companies, but first we would remove all known 
portfolio companies using the argentum database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 DTA refers to a specific format for a datafile, data analysis tools like Stata uses the format to store datasets 
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6.2 Variables 
 
In our Argentum dataset the most important variables were; organizational number and 
exit/entry year. In the Financial report dataset, we picked out what we needed based on the 
variables required to use the modified Jones Model and in PSM. The values needed from the 
SNF database to estimate Discretionary Accrual (DA) were; CA, CL, Cash, STD, DEP, 
Assets, PPE, REC, REV and have all been explain in appendix V. The values needed from 
the SNF database to find comparable companies through propensity score matching were; 
ROA, ROE, Sales, Leverage, Liquid, Growth, Pre-Tax Results, Payable Tax and have all 
been explain in appendix V. 
 
After collecting and adding the accounting data to our PE entry and exit datasets, we found 
several of our portfolio companies had missing values. Generating accounting data from 
three years before the entry/exit and two years after entry/exit also introduced missing 
values. If the company did not have accounting information for the three years before 
entry/exit and two years after the entry/exit, we could not use the company. This left us with 
160 unique portfolio companies in our PE exit dataset and 217 unique companies in our PE 
entry dataset.  
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7. Econometrics 
 
The modified Jones Model is built to estimate nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) through a 
regression. However, we cannot estimate the coefficients for the model. Since there is no 
existing proxy for NDA, to use as a dependent variable. We can instead use the calculated 
value for TA as our dependent variable, the three parameters still explain the NDA within 
TA. Only now, the residuals from the regression will be made out of discretionary accruals 
(DA) done for the companies. As long as the three explanatory variables in the model 
completely explains NDA, we will have no bias introduced in the proxy estimate for DA. 
But if the estimate is not representative of NDA this will introduce more error into the 
regression residuals.  
 
With the fixed effects model, we can control for the heteroskedasticity15 issue by allowing 
firms to use different intersects16 (Wooldridge 2013, pp.491-496). The alternatives are to 
either use a Random effect model, pooled OLS or first differenced model. Random effects 
(RE) and fixed effects (FE) is preferred over pooled OLS in cases where it is important to 
calculate the individual changes in subjects over time (Wooldridge 2013, pp.448-450). Fixed 
effect is more used than Random effects, since there are extra assumptions needed for the 
random effects model. We need the covariance of the intercept and each explanatory variable 
to equal zero. Meaning the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge 2013, p. 496). We used the Hausman test to find which of the two models gave 
a more correct estimate (Hausman 1978). If the model that uses Fixed effect comes out as 
statistically different from the Random effect model, we use fixed effect. If they are not 
statistically different we use the Random effect (Wooldridge 2013, p. 496) 
 
                                                 
15 Heteroskedasticity refers to the variation that we find in a regressions error term. The presence of heteroskedasticity can 
invalidate statistical tests. 
16 Intersects are starting values for models before calculating variable influence. 
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The next step is to run the regression using the modified Jones Model. Our data consists of 5 
accounting years for each unique company; the purchase/sales year, the two years before 
purchase/sale and the two years after the purchase/sale. This gives a total of 5 periods, which 
is the subject for our panel data regressions (Frees 2004, p. 192). We end up with a balanced 
dataset, with the same number of observations per company (Wooldridge 2013, p.469). With 
this data we can construct a panel data, with organizational number and accounting year as 
our unique signifiers. The four datasets are run separately, this gives us estimates for DAs in 
the purchase and sales periods for both portfolio companies and comparable companies. The 
comparable companies for both purchased and sold portfolio companies gives us the average 
of DAs in the remaining market with a similar divide in time periods and industries. 
 
 
 
The regression itself is a panel data regression, using a fixed effect which we selected 
through the Hausman test (Appendix H). By having panel data, we can view the unobserved 
factors that affect our dependent variable (Wooldridge 2013, p.459). with a fixed effect 
model, we may catch the unobserved effect by controlling for a variation in alpha-i. this is 
also called the unobserved firm heterogeneity17 (Wooldridge 2013, p.460). 
 
                                                 
17 Heterogeneity refers to any unbalanced reporting in the accounting data 
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7.1 PSM 
 
After narrowing down the two datasets we are left with control observations with similar 
asset sizes to observations in the treatment groups18. Will the current averaged estimate for 
DAs be a valid representation for a control group. Since we only match on the same year and 
industry and use a 10% range to find similar asset sizes. this crude matching form introduces 
the possibility of a selection bias in the remaining observations for each dataset (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1983, pp. 40-43). With a relatively small distribution of companies bought or sold 
by PE funds, the corresponding observations used for a benchmark used to quantify the test 
results can be difficult to select. Similarly using a random sample size or simply using the 
entire dataset can also introduce issues. A random selection will introduce greater variation 
than can be found in our portfolio companies, similarly using our entire dataset will have 
introduce to great of a variation in companies and variation will be greater than for our 
portfolio companies. 
 
With the divide between benchmark and portfolio companies, we can see how much 
nonacquired companies use earnings management compared to PE owned companies. This is 
predicated on finding comparable companies for the two groups, since our hypothesis 
concerns two distinct groups. We have the option to use propensity score matching to find 
the best fit out of our remaining datasets. We classify all observations where PE funds 
purchase a company as a treatment, while any company not in a PE portfolio will be the 
untreated observations. This is also called a control group and is in a different state to the 
portfolio companies because they do not have the same resources available to them. Only 
being able to observe one treatment state of any observation at a given period, means we 
have to speculate what firms would be comparable to the portfolio companies (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1983, pp. 40-43). This missing data problem is especially problematic in cases 
where we have a small subset of treatment observations, making it even harder to find any 
                                                 
18 A treatment group refers to any collection of data with a shared effect. 
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correlation between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables over the two 
groups. 
 
Propensity score requires a dependent variable, since we want to find companies with similar 
earnings management strategies. The estimated DA will not be exactly correct, since we 
calculate them using the larger datasets. While the propensity score matching will only pick 
out a small subset of companies to match against the portfolio companies. Had we not 
needed DA as our dependent variable, we would have used propensity score matching as our 
only matching tool. Seeing that we need to calculate DA beforehand, we have to assume that 
individual estimates for propensity scores will be based on DAs that give similar values with 
both approaches mentioned above. The average of subsamples used to calculate DAs will 
give a similar estimate of the market, so that individual companies will give similar residuals 
with both methods.   
 
Using PSM should mitigate the selection bias we get from our previous matching. The 
method matches companies on a comparable prediction for how likely they are of being part 
of a treatment group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, pp.41-43). There are many strong 
arguments for using PSM to find the companies for our benchmark, deriving a set of multi-
dimensional vectors down to a single value makes it much easier to compare effects between 
individual groups while maintaining a model complexity better suited to analyze larger 
datasets (Becker and Ichino 2002 pp. 358-360). Furthermore, underlying comparative 
variance will also be comparable when using PSM (Snedecor and Cochran 1980).  
 
There are many uses for Propensity score matching; in our case we are looking at differences 
in covariates in the treatment group and control group. This is referred to as the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) (Abadie and Imbens 2016). Instead we will have to 
use a method to find the closest fit, most commonly through Nearest-Neighbor Matching, 
Radius Matching, Kernel Matching or Stratification Matching (Becker and Ichino 2002, p. 
361). We choose the most straight forward method with Nearest-Neighbor Matching. Where 
we use the number n closest companies to each portfolio company (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
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2008, p. 9). We have looked at both scenarios where we use 1 nearest neighbor and 5 nearest 
neighbors.  
 
Another use for PSM is to match the outputs from the treatment group with other companies 
to find investment targets similar to what we already have invested in. With Propensity score 
matching there is a tradeoff between what you can analyze. On one hand PSM does not have 
the same requirements for a stable unit-treatment value assumption. Something other forms 
of matching needs to satisfy to accurately find comparable companies. This assumption 
refers to the casual effect over different treatment data when we use companies who compete 
over resources and/or customers. As the results from the untreated companies will in essence 
be an effect on treated companies and vice versa. This could be argued to be a violation of 
the stable unit-treatment value assumption. Which would introduce a selection bias to the 
dataset that could invalidate other forms of matching. Fulfilling this assumption is not 
required when applying propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, pp. 42-43). 
On the other side, propensity score matching needs a binomial set of groups that represent 
our treated and untreated data. This makes subtle classifications harder to fit into a model, 
certain compromises have to be done to be able to run the model. 
    
Our goal is to find companies that use similar earning management structures, so we want 
our dependent variable to be the proxy measure for DA earnings management. However, the 
DAs are meant to be calculated based on comparable companies. This means we would need 
to calculate DAs on the comparable companies. We have a measure for DA to use as a 
dependent variable, which would give us the comparable companies. In other words, we do 
not have a dependent variable for our PSM method. To solve this, we first use companies on 
accounting year, industry and asset size, we then use panel data regressions to find an 
approximation of what the DAs would be. We use this approximation as our dependent 
variable for propensity score matching. 
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8. Analysis 
 
8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
8.1.1 Entry Data 
 
Table x.1 shows the statistics from the Entry data used to investigate the first hypothesis: 
H1: PE Portfolio Companies’ discretionary AEM decreases in the entry period, relative to 
comparable companies. 
 
The table clearly shows that data from the comparable companies dominate the portfolio 
companies, in size. Where portfolio companies are only 0.85% of the total dataset, the 
portfolio company dataset consist of 189 firms, and the dataset with comparable companies 
consist of 21,987 firms. But the portfolio companies have a larger Assets mean and median 
than the comparable companies, where the difference in mean is significant at the 1% level. 
The variables where portfolio companies had a larger mean at a significant level of 1%, this 
is true for Sales, Growth, Cash, REC and Payable Tax. The difference in mean for the 
variables TA, Leverage, ROE, Liquid and Pre-Tax Results are not significantly different. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
Tabell x.1 Single samples and two sample summary statistics of the entry data 
   PE Portfolio 
Company 
Comparable 
Companies 
Private Companies. – PE 
portfolio companies   
   Mean   Median   Mean   Median  Diff in Mean   Diff t-value 
TA -0.252 -0.021 0.384 0.116 0.8731388 1.2387 
REC 25228.92 5375 4391.014 727 -12815.95 -8.3202 
Cash 7917.899 1520 2518.513 768 -2466.76 -2.7232 
ROA -0.147 0.009 0.146 0.111 0.5213168 14.0811 
ROE -0.033 0.097 0.551 0.331 1.166609 1.2970 
Sales 83277.5 11563 21861.28 4304 -33141.66 -7.1300 
Leverage 2.536 1.3 3.639 1.928 0.2629667 0.0206 
Liquid 2.028 1.31 6.561 1.342 4.825429 0.3452 
Growth 8829.603 2156 985.963 168 -9270.598 -5.5597 
Pre-Tax 
Results 
2475.921 7 1375.529 377 181.4232 0.1798 
Payable 
Tax 
1362.926 0 324.167 41 -796.1729 -5.5566 
Assets 79673.05 22824 15486.79 4303 -39339.34 -9.8984 
N 189 189 21987 21987 22176 22176 
 
The table contains description of PE backed portfolio companies from an entry period and comparable 
companies, which is “regular” private companies in same industries, same period and with assets within 
plus/minus 5% of our PE portfolio companies. The time period ranges from 1992-2016. This is the total set that 
the PSM create propensity scores from and where it chooses the nearest neighbors. It shows the means and 
median for the two groups. It shows the difference between the groups means and t-value statistics for the 
difference in means between them, with mean (non-PE) – mean (PE). 
 
 
8.1.2 Exit Data 
 
Table x.2 shows the statistics from the Entry data used to investigate the first hypothesis: 
H2: PE Portfolio Companies’ discretionary AEM decreases in the exit period, relative 
to comparable companies.  
 
The table clearly shows that the data from the comparable companies dominate the small PE 
portfolio data, in size. The PE portfolio Companies represent 1.323% of the total exit dataset. 
The PE Portfolio Company data subset consist of 136 firms, and the data subset with 
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Comparable Companies consist of 10,283 firms. The Assets mean and median are larger for 
the PE portfolio companies than for the comparable companies, where the Assets mean is 
significant different at the 1% level. Sales, ROA, Growth, Cash, REC and Payable Tax are 
all significant different at the 1% level. While Pre-Tax Results are significant different at the 
5% level, both mean and median are larger for the PE portfolio companies. There is no 
statistical significance for variables TA, Leverage, ROE and Liquidity.  
 
Tabell x.2 Single samples and two sample summary statistics of the exit data 
   PE Portfolio Company Comparable 
Companies 
Private Companies. – 
PE portfolio companies   
   Mean   Median   Mean   Median  Diff in 
Mean 
  Diff t-
value 
TA -0.041772 -0.045376 0.3367082 0.1128274 0.3784804 1.3145 
REC 56171.64 18015 8849.794 1215 -47321.85 -15.3918 
Cash 22893.57 3500.5 4538.356 943 -18355.21 -9.3474 
ROA -0.179 0.047 .144 0.103 0.3235267 11.7411 
ROE .003 .111 .464 .304  0.4608094 0.5060 
Sales 208000 33991 39608.38 5188 -168407.2 -9.8797 
Leverage 2.022 1.42 3.563 1.808 1.540564 0.2796 
Liquid 2.038 1.475 6.571 1.36   4.532805 0.7679 
Growth 23319.54 3294 1902.454 217 -21417.09 -8.7395 
Pre-Tax 
Results 
6461.434 963 2670.633 512 -3790.8 -2.4021 
Payable  
Tax 
1627.382 0 516.285 36 -1111.097     -4.9185 
Assets 213000 56839.5 32721.23 6877 -179893 -18.9415 
N 136 136 10147 10147 10283 10283 
 
The table contains description of PE backed portfolio companies from an exit period and companies, which is 
“regular” private companies in same industries, same period and with assets within plus/minus 5% of our PE 
portfolio companies. The time period ranges from 1992-2016. This is the total set that the PSM create 
propensity scores from and where it chooses the nearest neighbors. It shows the means and median for the two 
groups. It shows the difference between the groups means and t-value statistics for the difference in means 
between them, with mean (non-PE) – mean (PE). 
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8.2 Entry Data Analysis 
 
The entry dataset analysis is used to investigate the first hypothesis: H1: PE Portfolio 
Companies’ discretionary AEM decreases in the entry period, relative to comparable 
companies. 
 
To find an answer to our hypothesis we first calculate the discretionary accruals (DA) using 
the modified Jones Model, our dataset consists of 22,176 companies over a five-year period 
around the portfolio companies’ entry into a PE fund. The implementation of the modified 
Jones Model was done through a panel data fixed effect regression, to account for different 
intercepts for each firm in the dataset (Wooldridge 2013, p 496). Then we used a set of 
different characteristics (appendix V) to calculate a propensity scores with the nearest 
neighbor method, to find comparable companies (control group) for the PE portfolio 
Companies (treatment group). The match is based on firm data from the year before (t=-1) 
the PE firm invested into the portfolio company. When applying the teffects estimation 
method we base it on the propensity scores with the DA from the year before the PE firm 
invest, the investment year and the two years after the purchase as the dependent variable. 
We can see the ATET based on a comparison with the control group. This means that we 
assume that any changes or differences between the two groups can be attributed to the PE 
ownership and/or the effect from their purchase (Abadie and Imbens 2016, 783).  
 
 
Table E.1.1 is based on all portfolio companies that we have an investment date for and 
industry specifiers like; Manufacturing (Industry 4), Telecom/IT/Tech (Industry 5), 
Wholesale/Retail (Industry 8) & Other Services (Industry 10). Table E.1.1 shows the PE 
ownership/entry effect on the portfolio company through a comparison with the comparable 
companies. This is based on firm characteristics one year (t=-1) before the portfolio 
company was bought by a PE firm, the proxy for DAs act as dependent variables. We use 
DA proxies for the year before purchase (t=-1), the purchase year (t=0) and the next two 
years (t=+1 & t=+2). This allows us to see the changes in DA over time and lets us see what 
DA was before and after the purchase.  
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Positive estimates in our analysis would indicate a greater use of DA in the portfolio 
companies, indicating that the portfolio companies use more earnings management than what 
is normal. For our initial analysis we see that all four periods indicate a positive effect on DA 
when entering a newly bought firm. The only period that shows statistical significance is the 
entry year, at a 5% level. This means that for the one year before entry and the two years 
after entry we cannot say that there are any significant different in DAs between the 
companies not owned by a PE firm and PE-owned companies.  
 
Table E.1.1. ATET teffects, Residuals (DA), by time period, for all industries together 
(4,5,8 and 10):  
 One year before 
entry 
Entry year One year after 
entry 
Two years after 
entry 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0950 0.182* 0.0422 0.0465 
 (0.178) (0.0795) (0.187) (0.178) 
N 189 x 2 189 x 2 189 x 2 189 x 2 
     
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the PE portfolio companies and its Comparable companies, within the four largest industries in our 
dataset (industry 4, 5, 8 & 10). The year (t-1) is the year the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable 
companies is done, through the Propensity Score Matching. These years are from the investment period, where t=-1 is the 
year before the entry. The period, t=0 is the year that the PE firm entry into the portfolio company. While t=+1 is the year 
after they have invested, and t=+2 is two years after they have invested in the portfolio company. It shows the Average 
Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) with the proxy for discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), 
on the treatment group (PE portfolio Companies). Nearest neighbor is only one company per PE portfolio company, based 
on the closest Propensity score match estimated at t-1. Lastly does it display the total amount of firms used to calculate the 
treatment effect, and this consists of both groups.  
 
 
Table E.1.2. Is based on the same data as above, but we only performed the propensity score 
matching and ATET teffects on companies from the same industry. The same proxies for 
DA are still used as the dependent variable, when estimating the treatment effect in the 
different industries and at the different time periods. The reason for dividing it up into 
different industries is to see if there is any significant difference when accounting for the 
different effects industries can have on DA. Since none of the estimates came out as 
significant when testing for treatment effects, we cannot assume any trends in the data. 
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Table E.1.2. ATET teffects, divided on industries. Residuals (DA) one year before 
entry, for the entry year, one and two years after entry. The PE ownerships effect on 
Portfolio companies: 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10  
t=-1 0.0911 -0.107 -0.229 -1.911 ATET 
 (0.0784) (1.809) (0.289) (2.570) r1vs0.buyout 
t=0 0.0421 -0.0723 0.0697 0.828 ATET 
 (0.0520) (0.474) (0.105) (0.777) r1vs0.buyout 
t=+1 -0.0500 -0.240 0.0356 1.426 ATET 
 (0.0797) (0.491) (0.0494) (0.799) r1vs0.buyout 
t=+2 0.0167 -0.397 -0.0582 1.203 ATET  
 (0.0846) (0.503) (0.0603) (0.969) r1vs0.buyout 
N 36 x 2 56 x 2 27 x 2 69 x 2  
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the PE portfolio companies and its Comparable companies, with the industries: “Manufacturing” 
(Industry 4), “Telecom/IT/Tech” (Industry 5), “Wholesale / Retail” (Industry 8) & “Other Services” (Industry 10). The 
year (t-1) is the year the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable companies is done, through the 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM). These years are from the investment period, where t-1 is the year before the investment, 
t=0 is the year that the PE firm entry into the portfolio company. t=+1 is the year after they have invested, and t=+2 is two 
years after they have invested in the portfolio company. It shows the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) with the 
proxy for discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), on the treatment group (PE portfolio 
Companies). The last line (N) shows the total number of both portfolio companies and comparable companies that has been 
used to calculate the PSM and ATET teffects within the different industries. Nearest neighbor is only one company per PE 
portfolio company, based on the closest Propensity score match estimated at period t-1.  
 
 
Table E.1.3. is based on the same dataset as the two tables above, but instead of dividing the 
dataset into industries it has been divided into the different years available in our dataset. 
Some of the years have too few treatment observations to estimate the propensity score 
matching (PSM) and therefore the year has to be excluded from the analysis. The treatment 
effect from a portfolio company being owned by a PE fund varies between the different 
years. Most of them are not statistically significant, but there are a few that are significant at 
either a 5% or a 1% level. The values that are significant, show up in the period before the 
investment and the two years after the investment.  
 
The second column in table 1.3. contains the effect of the PE ownership on DA for the 
period t-1. The column shows that most of the years are not statistically significant, but in 
2002 there is a 5% level of statistically significance for an increase in the DAs. At the same 
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time the years 2007 and 2013 show a statistically significant difference at a 1% level and at a 
5% level. Both show a negative usage of DA at t-1, which indicates that the comparable 
company uses earnings management to a greater extent than the portfolio company. In the 
third column, the investment year for the PE firm. There are no years that come out with a 
statistically significant effect from PE ownership when dividing all PE firm entries into 
specific entry years (t=0).  
 
The fourth column shows one year after entry (t=+1), meaning the matching year will be 2 
years earlier. We see a few years where there is a statistically significant difference in the 
effect of PE investment/ownership. With matching data from 1999 and DA estimates from 
2001, we see that the investment has a negative effect on the DAs with a statistical 
significance at the 1% level. With matching data from 2004 and DA estimates from 2006 we 
also see a statistically significant difference, but here the PE investment has increased the 
use of DAs compared to comparable companies. The last significant result in period t+1 is 
using accounting data from 2008 to find matching companies and a DA estimate from 2010. 
It shows a decreasing effect on DAs from PE ownership with a statistical significance at a 
1% level. While the rest of the years in this period (t+1) shows no statistical difference from 
the PE ownership effect on the DAs.    
 
The last period of interest (t+2) is 3 years after the matching year and is shown in column 
five. It displays one statistically different value between the PE investment and the 
comparable company. The accounting data used for this matching comes from 2011 and with 
DA estimates from 2014. It shows that there is statistically significant effect from the PE 
firm’s investment at a 5% level. It is an increasing effect, meaning there are indications that 
the portfolio company used earnings management to a greater extent than the comparable 
company. However, over all columns and all rows we see no discernable trends from the 
coefficients. 
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Table E.1.3. ATET teffects, All PE portfolio companies in industry 4,5,8 and 10, per 
year. Matching year (t-1) vs DA in entry year, one year after and two years after entry. 
 
Matchin
g 
Year 
 
(t = -1) 
Residual One 
Year Before 
Entry 
(t = -1) 
Residual Entry 
Year 
 
(t = 0) 
Residual One 
Year After 
Entry 
(t = +1) 
Residual Two 
Years After 
Entry 
(t = +2) 
 
 
N 
t=-1 ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
 
Year 5 
1998 
0.278 
(0.323) 
0.0742 
(0.242) 
-0.0680 
(0.125) 
-0.248 
(0.143) 
3 x 2 
Year 6 
1999 
-1.065 
(0.919) 
2.291 
(2.272) 
-0.454*** 
(0.0933) 
1.012 
(1.117) 
3 x 2 
Year 7 
2000 
0.166 
(0.182) 
-0.121 
(0.282) 
0.106 
(0.207) 
0.218 
(0.248) 
4 x 2 
Year 9 
2002 
0.757* 
(0.298) 
0.233 
(0.230) 
-0.120 
(0.558) 
0.302 
(0.299) 
9 x 2 
Year 10 
2003 
0.216 
(0.790) 
-0.435 
(0.319) 
-0.0896 
(0.726) 
-0.163 
(0.762) 
10 x 2 
Year 11 
2004 
-0.675 
(0.651) 
0.00661 
(0.302) 
0.560* 
(0.218) 
0.0712 
(1.122) 
10 x 2 
Year 12 
2005 
-0.0748 
(0.101) 
-0.325 
(0.216) 
0.290 
(0.462) 
-0.517 
(0.287) 
9 x 2 
Year 13 
2006 
-0.846 
(0.630) 
-0.573 
(0.668) 
-0.661 
(0.612) 
2.255 
(2.317) 
23 x 2 
Year 14 
2007 
-0.698** 
(0.214) 
0.244 
(0.521) 
0.323 
(0.642) 
-0.310 
(0.224) 
9 x 2 
Year 15 
2008 
0.623 
(0.324) 
0.0617 
(0.236) 
-0.292** 
0.100) 
0.224 
(0.259) 
23 x 2 
Year 16 
2009 
1.023 
(1.019) 
0.269 
(0.203) 
0.0863 
(0.223) 
-0.143 
(0.348) 
23 x 2 
Year 17 
2010 
0.108 
(0.157) 
0.0299 
(0.130) 
0.194 
(0.267) 
-0.108 
(0.544) 
18 x 2 
Year 18 
2011 
-2.327 
(2.278) 
0.784 
(0.604) 
1.536 
(0.856) 
1.651* 
(0.781) 
16 x 2 
Year 19 
2012 
-0.264 
(0.235) 
-0.0450 
(0.119) 
0.159 
(0.186) 
0.0272 
(0.133) 
8 x 2 
Year 20 
2013 
-0.157* 
(0.0674) 
0.0653 
(0.0905) 
-0.295 
(0.325) 
0.301 
0.232) 
10 x 2 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the year (t-1) which is the year the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable 
companies is done, through the Propensity Score Matching. These years are from the investment period, where t=0 is the 
year that the PE firm invest into the portfolio company. While t=+1 is the year after they have entered, and t=+2 is two 
years after they have invested into the portfolio company. It shows the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) with 
the proxy for discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), on the treatment group (PE portfolio 
Companies). Column six display the total amount of firms used to calculate the treatment effect, and this consists of both 
groups. Nearest neighbor is only one company per PE portfolio company, based on the closest Propensity score match 
estimated at t-1. The last column shows the amount of Portfolio Companies used in the PSM teffects estimation. 
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8.2.1 Comparing Nearest Neigbors 
From the tables E.1.1, E.1.2 and E.1.3 we see very little significant difference between the 
treatment group and the control group. The analysis indicates that the treatment effect has 
little to do with the DA estimates. For the first table we did not narrow down the datasets, 
the result only showed one statistically significant period. At the purchase year we saw a 
positive coefficient that was positive at a 5% level, which indicates that portfolio companies 
performed more discretional the comparable companies. When we divide it up into different 
industries, none of the industries show any statistical significance. When dividing up 
observations into years rather than industries, we can again see some scattered values that 
are statistically significant. Here we do not see any trends in the estimates where they are 
coming out as statistically significant. To see if the selected group of comparable companies 
changes the outcome from the analysis, we perform the same test with different numbers of 
nearest neighbors (3 or 5). As shown in appendix X (PSM with several NN), if we analyze 
the entire dataset again the results are mostly the same as when we used one nearest 
neighbor.  
 
Table E.1.4. ATET teffects, Residuals (DA), by time period, for all industries together 
(4,5,8 and 10), with 1 Nearest Neighbors (NN) and 5 NN:  
 One year before 
entry 
Entry year One year after 
entry 
Two years after 
entry 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
With 1 NN 0.0950 0.182* 0.0422 0.0465 
 (0.178) (0.0795) (0.187) (0.178) 
N 
 
189 x 2 189 x 2 189 x 2 189 x 2 
ATET     
With 5 NN 0.123 0.147** 0.0710 0.111 
 (0.151) (0.0522) (0.126) (0.148) 
N 189 x 6 189 x 6 189 x 6 189 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the PE portfolio companies and its Comparable companies, within the four largest industries in our 
dataset (industry 4, 5, 8 & 10). The year (t-1) is the year the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable 
companies is done, through the Propensity Score Matching. These years are from the investment period, where t=-1 is the 
year before the entry. The period, t=0 is the year that the PE firm entry into the portfolio company. While t=+1 is the year 
after they have invested, and t=+2 is two years after they have invested in the portfolio company. It shows the Average 
Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) with the proxy for discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), 
on the treatment group (PE portfolio Companies). Nearest neighbor is both one and five companies per PE portfolio 
company, based on the nearest Propensity score match estimated at t-1. Lastly does it display the total amount of firms used 
to find the propensity scores, this consists of both groups (PE Portfolio companies and non-portfolio companies). 
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We do further tests to see the difference in other sizes of nearest-neighbor, next we divide 
the companies into specific industries again. With only one nearest neighbor we see no 
statistically significant effect from a PE funds ownership, when using five nearest neighbors 
there are some statistically significant values emerging. Two of the results in the analysis 
comes out with statistical significance, both at the 1% level. The first value is one year 
before the PE firm’s entry, in industry 8 at t-1. The other one is in industry 4 at t+2. From the 
estimates we can see that both values are showing a negative effect on the treated group. 
Since the values are in separate industries, we cannot draw a conclusion based on changes 
before and after involvement with a PE fund within an industry. What we do see are lower 
rates of earnings management than the comparable companies in the two cases before and 
after the PE funds entry (shown in table x.1.3. to x.1.6.). 
 
The comparison between one nearest neighbor and five nearest neighbors in the dataset 
separated by year, shows again that most of the years and periods have no significant effect 
on DAs for the portfolio companies. Four of the years in the period t-1 comes out with a 
statistical significance when using five nearest neighbors (NN). Two years where the effect 
increase the DA and two other years that show a decreasing effect on the DA, there is an 
effect with statistically significance level at 1% level and one at the 5% level (appendix X, 
table x.1.7 to table x.1.9.). Three of the four years that come out with a statistically 
significant effect when using 5 NN, also have a statistical significant effect when using one 
nearest neighbor. In the years 2002, 2007 and 2013 (table E.1.3.), for 5 nearest neighbors 
2012 also shows up as statistically significant.  
 
The third column contains the teffects PSM results for the entry year and it showed no 
statistically significant effect in any of the years. The same is true when applying five nearest 
neighbors in the teffects PSM estimation as seen in appendix X (table x.1.10 to table x.1.12). 
One year after the PE firm’s investment into the portfolio company few values show up as 
statistically significant. Calculated with both one nearest neighbor (table E.1.3. column 4) 
and five nearest neighbors (Appendix X, table x.1.13. to table x.1.15).  The years in period 
t+1 comes out with two values that are statistically significant, one at the 1% level and one at 
5% level. Both are positive estimates, which means that in the matching years 2002 and 
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2011 in table x.1.13 and x.1.15 the effect of PE ownership is an increase in the earnings 
management for the portfolio companies. These two years do not come out statistically 
significant when only applying one nearest neighbor. However, in column four three were 
statistically significant with one nearest neighbor. The last period t+2, has only one 
statistically significant value at a 5% level when estimating with one nearest neighbor. When 
applying five nearest neighbors there is only one year that comes out as statistically 
significant. This is the same year for both calculations (1 & 5 NN). The year 2014 with 
matching data from 2011, both show an effect of increasing DA for this period and specific 
year, at the 5% level. 
 
8.3 Exit Data Analysis 
 
The exit dataset analysis is used to investigate the second hypothesis: H2: PE Portfolio 
Companies’ discretionary AEM decreases in the exit period, relative to comparable 
companies. 
We use the same method to analyze the exit data, with PE owned companies and other 
comparable companies that are not owned by PE firms. With exit data from the PE portfolio 
companies as a basis to first find comparable companies, for then to calculate the relevant 
factors needed for our analysis. However, we have gone through this in more depth in the 
data gathering, econometrics and descriptive statistics sections of our paper. The final exit 
data that is used for calculating the DAs through the modified Jones Model, consists in total 
of 10,280 unique companies. The calculated DAs from the modified Jones Model was 
estimated through a fixed effects panel data regression. This dataset was further used to 
calculate propensity scores through the PSM method for all companies, using the nearest 
neighbor method. The period that is used to find comparable companies is one year before 
the PE firm exits (t = -1). This is used to see if there are any treatment effects on companies 
before, during and after the exit year. Any significant difference in the exit period can be 
assumed to be attributed to the PE ownership and/or the liquidation (exit) they have done 
before or in this period. 
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Table E.2.1. shows the outcome from the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) 
with the PSM. These calculations use the original exit dataset as explained above. It consists 
of all PE backed and comparable companies, from all years and all industries in our dataset 
(industry 4, 5, 8 & 10), consisting of 10280 firms. The PE ownership and/or exit effect on 
the portfolio company through a comparison against the comparable companies, is based on 
the firm characteristics one year before (t=-1) the PE firm divests from the portfolio 
company. The calculations have been estimated one year before the exit (t=-1). For the exit 
year (t=0), one year after exit and for the two years after exit (t=+1 & t=+2). The only time 
period that show statistical significance at a 1% level is two years after exit. The effect from 
the period before the exit, during the exit and the years after the exit comes out as negative, 
the only one that comes out as significant is the t=+2 period. This indicates that the earnings 
management after sale is lower in the sold company compared to the comparative company. 
 
 
Table E.2.1. ATET teffects, Residuals (DA) for both groups, by time period, for all 
industries together (4,5,8 and 10):  
 
 One year before 
exit 
Exit year One year after 
exit 
Two years after 
exit 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.491 -0.444 -0.442 -0.477*** 
 (0.436) (0.465) (0.452) (0.106) 
N 135 x 2 135 x 2 135 x 2 135 x 2 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the PE portfolio companies and its Comparable companies, within the four largest industries in our 
dataset (industry 4, 5, 8 & 10). The year (t-1) is the year the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable 
companies is done, through the Propensity Score Matching. These years are from the exit period, where t=-1 is the year 
before the exit, t=0 is the year that the PE firm exits from the portfolio company. While t=+1 is the year after they have sold 
out, and t=+2 is two years after they have exited out of the portfolio company. It shows the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET) with the proxy for discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), on the treatment 
group (PE portfolio Companies). Nearest neighbor is only one company per PE portfolio company, based on the nearest 
Propensity score match estimated with characteristics from t-1. Lastly does N display the total amount of firms used to 
calculate the propensity scores and find the nearest neighbor. 
 
 
Table E.2.2. Is derived from the same original dataset as above (table E.2.1.). The main 
difference being that it is divided into industries when estimating the propensity scores and 
ATET teffects. Still using the proxy for DA from each firm at the different time periods in 
the exit period (t=-1, t=0, t=+1 & t=+2) as the dependent variable. We divide the dataset into 
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the different industries with the motive that this could separate the industry specific earnings 
management that are being done. From the table we can see indications that former PE 
portfolio companies undertake less DA than their comparable companies in the years after 
the PE firm has exited. This is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level at two different 
time periods, for the industry called Other industries (industry 10). This industry consists of 
mainly different types of service companies, consultancies and a variety of companies that 
do not fit into the other more traditional industries.  
 
The statistically significant result from industry 10 in the exit year, shows that those who 
have been owned by a PE company in this industry, performed less DA than their 
comparable companies at the same period of time. This is also true for the year after the exit 
in industry 10, with a statistical significance at the 1% level. In the industry 4, 5 and 8 in the 
exit year (t=0) and the year after (t=+1) there is no clear or any statistically difference 
between the effect of being owned by a PE firm in the past. Therefore, the most we can 
summarize is that there is not any statistically significant difference between the two groups 
in these two periods for the industries “Manufacturing” (Industry 4), “Telecom/IT/Tech” 
(Industry 5) and “Wholesale / Retail” (Industry 8). For the time period two years after exit, 
do previous portfolio companies from both industry 5 and industry 8 come out as using less 
DA than their comparable companies, with statistically significant at the 5% level. In the 
same period (t=+2) we cannot conclude that industry 4 and 10 use any more or less DA than 
their comparable companies, since the estimated effect are not statically significance at 
either the 5% or 1 % level for this period. Finally, in industry 8 we also see negative 
estimates that are statistically significant in the year before the sale. Indicating that in 
industry 8 there was already less earnings management in the portfolio company before the 
sale. 
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Table E.2.2. PE portfolio companies by the industries 4, 5, 8 & 10 together, and with all 
years (1992-2016). Matching year (t-1). 
 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10  
t = -1 0.0265 -0.319 -0.120* -0.397 ATET 
 (0.0397) (0.201) (0.0555) (0.211) r1vs0.buyout 
t = 0 -0.0618 0.101 0.0767 -0.277* ATET 
 (0.0553) (0.709) (0.0475) (0.135) r1vs0.buyout 
t = +1 0.0559 -0.184 -0.000343 -0.241** ATET 
 (0.0886) (0.214) (0.0397) (0.0845) r1vs0.buyout 
t = +2 0.0403 -0.555* -0.0974* 0.621 ATET 
 (0.0358) (0.228) (0.0468) (0.616) r1vs0.buyout 
N 25 x 2 47 x 2 20 x 2 44 x 2  
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the PE portfolio companies and its Comparable companies, with the industries: “Manufacturing” 
(Industry 4), “Telecom/IT/Tech” (Industry 5), “Wholesale / Retail” (Industry 8) & “Other Services” (Industry 10). The 
year (t-1) is the year before exit, and it is when the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable companies 
is done, through the Propensity Score Matching (PSM). These years are from the divestment period, where t=0 is the year 
that the PE firm exits the portfolio company. While t=+1 is the year after they have exited, and t=+2 is two years after they 
have exited from the portfolio company. It shows the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) with the proxy for 
discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), on the treatment group (PE portfolio Companies). The 
last line (N) shows the total number of firms in both groups, based on the portfolio companies and comparable companies. 
Which has been used to calculate the PSM and ATET teffects within the different industries.  Nearest neighbor is only one 
company per PE portfolio company, based on the closest Propensity score match estimated at t-1. 
 
Table E.2.3. uses the same dataset as the two tables above, but where the dataset is divided 
up into the different years, instead of industries. The time period goes from 1992 to 2016, 
but where several of years are missing. This has mainly two reasons, one being that some 
years have been lost when cleaning and creating variables. While the years that are 
completely missing from the table below arises from there being too few treatment 
observations in our dataset to calculate the PSM. Therefore, we cannot measure the PE 
investment effect on the portfolio company’s DA for these missing years. The treatment 
effect of having a PE ownership or investment from a PE firm on the portfolio company’s 
DA varies between the different years. Where most of the years do not have any statistically 
significant difference in the DAs for those who previously have been a PE portfolio 
company. Our dependent variable is estimated per company using accounting data from 
several periods (t=-1, t=0, t=+1 & t=+2), this helps us compare DAs from before and after 
the sale. The first period t=-1, which is the year before the PE firm divests from the portfolio 
company. Is seen in table E.2.3. second column and show that in most of the years there is 
no significant difference effect on the DAs from the PE firms exit. There are two years that 
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come out as statistically significant at the 1% level, both show a decreasing effect in the 
period, one year before the exit. This is for the years 2011 and 2012 at t=-1. Indicating that 
during the final year the company was managed by the PE fund they used less earnings 
management than their comparable companies. 
 
The year that the PE firm divest from the portfolio company at t=0, have one estimate that is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and none at the 5% level. This is the exits done in 
2008, based on the comparable companies found from 2007 firm characteristics, which was 
one year before the exit (t = -1). The estimate is negative, and that is interpret as the effect of 
the PE exit /ownership lead to less DA for this specified period and year. In the third period t 
= +1 (column four), most of the years are not statically significant. However, two of the 
years in this period shows positive estimates with a statistical significance at the 1% level. 
This is for the years 2009 and 2011, with accounting data from 2007 and 2009 used to find 
matching companies. Indicating that when the PE fund sold their portfolio companies and 
new owners had influence over the company. Their choice was normally to increase earnings 
management. 
 
The fourth and last period is two years after the sale (t = +2), which also lacks statistically 
significance for most of the years. However, there are two different years that the positive 
estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is for the year 2004 and the matches 
are done with data from the firm’s characteristics in 2001 (t = -1). And for the year 2011, 
done on matching of firm characteristics on its 2008 data (t = -1). This effect tells us that 
since the PE firm has exited may this have led to more DA two years after exit, in the years 
2004 and 2011. From portfolio companies exited in the years 2002 and 2009. 
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Table E.2.3. All PE portfolio companies in industry 4,5,8 and 10, per year. Matching 
year (t-1) vs DA one year before exit, in the exit year, one year after and two years after 
exit. 
Matching Year 
 
(t = -1) 
Residual One 
Year Before 
Exit 
(t = -1) 
Residual Exit 
Year 
(t = 0) 
Residual One 
Year After 
Exit 
(t = +1) 
Residual Two 
Years After 
Exit 
(t = +2) 
N 
t-1 ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
(St. Error) 
ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
(St. Error) 
ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
(St. Error) 
ATET 
r1vs0.buyout 
(St. Error) 
 
Year 2 
1998 
-0.0844 
(0.360) 
0.102 
(0.175) 
-0.298 
(0.452) 
-0.815 
(0.468) 
5 x 2 
Year 5 
2001 
-0.0309 
(0.239) 
0.0536 
(0.109) 
-0.119 
(0.137) 
0.151*** 
(0.0113) 
3 x 2 
Year 6 
2002 
-0.00952 
(0.358) 
-0.197 
(0.187) 
0.297 
(0.175) 
0.00797 
(0.189) 
8 x 2 
Year 8 
2004 
-0.00898 
(0.0792) 
-0.182 
(0.121) 
-0.0502 
(0.142) 
-0.0867 
(0.193) 
16 x 2 
Year 9 
2005 
-0.0555 
(0.206) 
-0.282 
(0.335) 
-0.134 
(0.258) 
-0.0273 
(0.364) 
7 x 2 
Year 10 
2006 
0.165 
(0.202) 
-0.657 
(0.683) 
0.282 
(0.205) 
0.123 
(0.144) 
17 x 2 
Year 11 
2007 
0.0309 
(0.0644) 
-0.222** 
(0.0740) 
0.257*** 
(0.0198) 
-0.0537 
(0.0706) 
7 x 2 
Year 12 
2008 
-0.362 
(0.356) 
0.104 
(0.203) 
-0.0580 
(0.141) 
0.204** 
(0.0634) 
7 x 2 
Year 13 
2009 
-0.167 
(0.137) 
0.131 
(0.274) 
0.568*** 
(0.0622) 
-0.432 
(0.398) 
5 x 2 
Year 14 
2010 
-0.607 
(0.499) 
1.465 
(1.841) 
-0.245 
(0.479) 
-0.195 
(0.482) 
15 x 2 
Year 15 
2011 
-0.219** 
(0.0827) 
-0.168 
(0.218) 
0.300 
(0.252) 
0.0281 
(0.152) 
10 x 2 
Year 16 
2012 
-0.189** 
(0.0582) 
-0.0253 
(0.116) 
0.101 
(0.0726) 
-0.208 
(0.276) 
14 x 2 
Year 17 
2013 
0.0403 
(0.0518) 
0.0599 
(0.0815) 
 
-0.0964 
(0.0768) 
-0.0960 
(0.111) 
15 x 2 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the year (t-1) which is the year the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable 
companies is done, through the Propensity Score Matching. These years are from one year before the divestment period t=-
1, and where t=0 is the year that the PE firm exits from the portfolio company. While t=+1 is the year after they have sold 
out, and t=+2 is two years after they have exited out of the portfolio company. It shows the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET) with the proxy for discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), on the treatment 
group (PE portfolio Companies). Column six display the total amount of firms used to calculate the treatment effect, and 
this consists of both groups. Nearest neighbor is only one company per PE portfolio company, based on the closest 
Propensity score match estimated at t-1. The last column shows the amount of Portfolio Companies used in the PSM 
teffects estimation. 
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8.3.1 Comparing Nearest Neigbors 
 
The DA in the Exit period done by PE owned companies and comparable companies, are 
shown in our data to not have statistically significant different in most cases. These estimates 
are calculated using one nearest neighbor. In table E.2.4 we see a comparison between PSM 
outputs with both one and five nearest neighbors (NN). When only having one nearest 
neighbor in period t=+2 the coefficient indicates a greater use of earnings management from 
the PE firms, with a statistical significance at 1 % level. This is gone when using the five 
nearest neighbors, the effect from the PE firms exit in periods of interest show no 
statistically significant difference.  
 
 
Table E.2.4. Exit data, ATET teffects, Residuals (DA), by time period, for all industries 
together (4,5,8 and 10), with 1 Nearest Neighbors (NN) and 5 NN:  
 
 One year before 
exit 
Exit year One year after 
exit 
Two years after 
exit 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
With 1 NN -0.491 -0.444 -0.442 -0.477*** 
 (0.436) (0.465) (0.452) (0.106) 
N 
 
135 x 2 135 x 2 135 x 2 135 x 2 
ATET     
With 5 NN -0.102 0.0328 0.0328 -0.601 
 (0.182) (0.237) (0.203) (0.607) 
N 
  
135 x 6 135 x 6 135 x 6 135 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
The table consists of the PE portfolio companies and its Comparable companies, within the four largest industries in our 
dataset (industry 4, 5, 8 & 10). The year (t-1) is the year the matches between PE portfolio company and the comparable 
companies is done, through the Propensity Score Matching. These years are from the exit period, where t=-1 is the year 
before the exit. The period, t=0 is the year that the PE firm exits from the portfolio company. While t=+1 is the year after 
they have divested, and t=+2 is two years after they have divested from the portfolio company. It shows the Average 
Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) with the proxy for discretionally accruals (residuals from the Modified Jones Model), 
on the treatment group (PE portfolio Companies). Nearest neighbor is both one and five companies per PE portfolio 
company, based on the nearest Propensity score matching estimated at t-1. Lastly does it display the total amount of firms 
used to find the propensity scores, this consists of both groups (PE Portfolio companies and non-portfolio companies).  
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When the exit dataset is divided into industries, it is only a minority of the periods that show 
statistically significant effect from the PE ownership/exit. As seen in table E.2.2. when using 
one nearest neighbor per portfolio company in the teffects PSM estimations. Most of those 
who are statistically significant disappears when applying five nearest neighbors. The year 
before the exit (t=-1) is the only period that still has a statistical different effect at the 5% 
level, but only for Industry 8. Which is the Wholesale and/or Retail industry. When using the 
five nearest neighbors on the industry divided data, industry 4 in period t=+2 also comes out 
with a decreasing effect on DA from the previously owned portfolio companies. This is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (see Appendix Y, table y.1.3.).  
 
 
From the dataset that is divided into years in table E.2.3 with the use of one nearest neighbor, 
we see that in most of the years no statistically significant effect is found from the 
exit/ownership. Using five nearest neighbors when calculating the ATET we see that there is 
actually fewer years that comes out with a statistically significant in the period of interest. In 
the first period, t = -1 (one year before exit) there is only one year where we see statistical 
significance. This is significant at the 1% level and is for year 2012 and it shows a negative 
estimate (Appendix Y, table y.1.9.). In the exit year (t = 0) table y.1.11. in appendix Y, show 
a decreasing effect on the DA with a statistically significance level at the 1% level, for the 
sales/exits done in 2008. This is calculated with the five nearest neighbors per portfolio 
company with firms’ characteristics from 2007. The exits performed in 2014 show an 
increasing effect on the DA, which means that in 2014 comparable companies performed 
more earnings management than the portfolio companies. This is statistically significant at 
the 1% level with the use of the five nearest neighbors when calculating the teffects PSM 
estimations. The results can be seen in Appendix Y, table 1.12. under the matching year 
2013 (t=-1).   
 
In the table E.2.3. column four at t=+1, there were two years with an increasing treatment 
effect from the exit. This was statistically significant at the 1% level when using one nearest 
neighbor. When applying five nearest neighbors all the significant value disappears and we 
are left with see no statistical significance for the year after the sale. The last period t=+2, 
two years after the PE firms exit from the Portfolio Companies. We see that the calculated 
effect on DA when using only one nearest neighbor mostly did not show any significant 
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difference the treatment group and the control group. The two results that were statistically 
significant are showing an increasing effect on DA from the PE firms exit. For the same 
period (t=+2) with five nearest neighbors as seen in Appendix Y, table y.1.16 to table y.1.18, 
have no results that show any statistically significant effect two years after exit. 
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9. Issues 
 
We cannot be sure that the benchmark data does not contain any PE owned companies. We 
start off with every company with accounting reports for the time period between 1992 and 
2016, then removing all companies we find in the dataset containing PE owned companies. 
If there are PE owned companies besides the ones, we have accounted for from our data we 
could risk using them in our benchmark data. This would introduce a bias, as one of our 
main objectives is to test effects on earnings management on companies owned by PE funds 
compared to those not owned by PE funds.   
 
Applying a model developed on American accounting standards to a Norwegian accounting 
system can introduce mistakes. Firstly, there is the issue to interpret equivalent accounting 
data in Norwegian reports to different foreign accounting data. In these cases, we will need 
to interpret jones intentions through his literature. As well as using descriptions of foreign 
accounting data. Secondly, we need to understand the differences in calculating individual 
accounting data. Many of the accounting data that are reliant on discretionary accruals (DA) 
have different standards for calculating accounting data like depreciations and amortization. 
Recalculating accounting data to better fit Norwegian accounting standards can be 
problematic, especially with the limited data we have available to us.  
 
Norwegian accounting laws only require reporting once a year. This leaves us with less 
accurate data in the transition period from privately owned to PE owned and PE owned to 
new owner. Not knowing what time of year the trade was made, we cannot know how recent 
potential earnings management occurred. Either a small or large part of the year could have 
been under the old owners and with a different earnings management strategy. The effect on 
new owners would have been dependent on when the purchase happened. This makes 
changes in event years a less accurate measure for earnings management.   
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Using data where observations have different event years introduces a need for comparable 
companies from the same year. The problem arises when we want to separate data into years 
and/or industries for the PSM. In these instances, the treatment group will not have any or 
have too few treatment observations for the PSM to run. With a minimum of 3 treatment 
observations being needed to preform teffects psmatch. 
 
Using propensity score matching to find comparable data relies on a dependent variable 
which represents the effects on DA. Our goal with PSM is to find differences in DA, but to 
do this we need to find the residuals for the regression we have not run yet. We assume that 
the average used to calculate the propensity score will have a similar distribution to the 
population, which would have given a similar average when calculating the residuals. Seeing 
that the parameters for an individual residual is still the same. If the estimated coefficients 
remain similar in the two cases, we would get an approximation for DA.  
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10. Conclution 
 
We do not see many estimates with a statistically significant different effect on Portfolio 
companies’ discretional accrual earnings management. In the entry dataset, the first analysis 
indicated that there had been done more earnings management on portfolio companies in the 
investment year. The analysis on different industries did not show any persistent statistical 
difference with earnings management in the investment period. The same is when we 
divided the dataset into different years. All these analyses indicate that there is little to no 
significant treatment effect related to a private equity funds acquisition of a private company 
in regard to earnings management. There are also few results with statistical significance in 
the tables related to the exit period of a portfolio company, with seemingly no clear 
correlation between those estimates who come out as statistically significant. Therefore, we 
conclude that there are little to no indications of a treatment effect from the PE ownership in 
the two periods of interest.  
 
Further research into earnings management would affect future evaluation methods used for 
investment in the private equity marked. Our master thesis elaborates on the understanding 
of how the Norwegian private equity market use earnings management in financial reporting. 
By looking at the purchase and sales period in a portfolio companies life cycle we focus on 
how the potential change in owners and how the potential profits incentivize earnings 
management. In markets where information asymmetry is a major fault for mispricing, 
understanding the little information that is available becomes key to better evaluate the 
company.  
 
In our paper we only analyzed the implications of accrual earnings management on 
purchases and sales for portfolio companies. With real earnings management being the less 
researched topic among the two types of earnings management. Further research into real 
earnings management involving entry and exit periods could be interesting. Other parts of a 
company’s life cycle could also be a compelling research area.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix H 
 
Hausman test PE entry data, panel data, 5 years per firm. 
 
This Stata output from the Hausman test has a null hypothesis that: Random effect is the correct one to use. But 
this must be rejected, when it is significant different. Which it is, and therefore must we conclude that fixed 
effect model is the better model. 
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Hausman test on comparable firms’ dataset, 5 years per firm 
 
This Stata output from the Hausman test has a null hypothesis that: Random effect is the correct one to use. But 
this must be rejected, when it is significant different. Which it is, and therefore must we conclude that fixed 
effect model is the better model. 
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Appendix V 
 
Variables used in this Master Thesis 
All variables used in the Modified Jones Model estimation: 
Variable Description 
CA CA is an abbreviation of Current Assets and it refers to all assets that are highly 
liquid and is expected to be traded within a year. 
It is a part of the formula estimating Total Accrual. 
CL CL is an abbreviation of Current Liabilities and it refers to all liabilities that will 
expire within 1 year. 
It is part of the formula estimating Total Accrual. 
Cash Cash refers to all monetary resources that are available at time of listing. 
It is part of the formula estimating Total Accrual. 
STD STD is an abbreviation of Short Term Debt and it refers to all short term 
liabilities that fall within the definition of debt, which is borrowed money.   
It is part of the formula estimating Total Accrual. 
DEP  DEP is an abbreviation of Depreciation and it refers to both Depreciation and 
Amortization for the current accounting year. 
It is part of the formula estimating Total Accrual. 
TA TA is an abbreviation of Total Accrual and it refers to the total amount of 
accrual accounting decisions utilized in a financial report. 
The formula to estimate Total Accrual uses CA, CL, Cash, STD, DEP and the 
previous accounting years assets. 
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REC  REC is an abbreviation of Receivables and refers to customer purchases not yet 
paid for. 
It is part of the formula estimating Nondiscretionary Accrual. 
REV REV is an abbreviation of Revenue and refers to all income company receives 
from its operations. 
It is part of the formula estimating Nondiscretionary Accrual. 
PPE PPE is an abbreviation of property, plant and equipment and it refers to all 
assets the company is expected to own for more than 1 year. 
It is part of the formula estimating Nondiscretionary Accrual. 
NDA NDA is an abbreviation of Nondiscretionary Accrual and refers to accrual 
accounting decisions not made on the managers discretion in the financial 
report. 
The formula to estimate Total Accrual uses REC, REV, PPE and the previous 
accounting years assets. 
Pre-Tax 
Results 
Pre-Tax Results refers to the result before the cost of taxes has been subtracted.  
It is part of the formula estimating Return On Assets and is used as an 
explanatory variable in PSM. 
ROA ROA is an abbreviation of Return On Assets and is a measure for how 
profitable a company is relative to its assets. Estimated with the formula  
 , it divides net income on average total assets. 
It is used as an explanatory variable in PSM. 
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ROE ROE is an abbreviation of Return On Equity and is a measure for how 
profitable a company is relative to its equity. Estimated as net income divided 
by equity.  
It is used as an explanatory variable in PSM. 
Sales Sales refer to income from sales in total revenue 
It is used as an explanatory variable in PSM. 
Leverage Leverage refers to the degree of dept in a company and is measured by dividing 
debt on equity.  
It is used as an explanatory variable in PSM. 
Liquid Liquid is a measure of the assets liquidity and it is estimated by dividing CA by 
CL.  
It is used as an explanatory variable in PSM. 
Growth Growth is a measure of the change in assets over one accounting year and is 
estimated as total assets in accounting year minus total assets in previous 
accounting year.   
It is used as an explanatory variable in PSM. 
buyout A dummy variable, identifying what company was bought or sold by a private 
equity portfolio company. 
It is used as the treatment variable in PSM. 
Payable  
Tax 
Payable Tax refers to the amount companies are legally obliged to pay each 
accounting year.  
It is used in descriptive statistics. 
Assets Assets refer to all resources owned by the company, it is used in descriptive 
statistics. Assets lagged 1 year are used in the TA and NDA formulas under the 
name Assets_last_year and At-1, it is also used in the Growth measure. 
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APPENDIX X 
 
ENTRY DATA 
 
Table x.1.1. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, nn = 5, 
all industries and years together, only divided by period around the entry:  
 One year before 
entry 
Entry year One year after 
entry 
Two years after 
entry 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.123 0.147** 0.0710 0.111 
 (0.151) (0.0522) (0.126) (0.148) 
N 189 x 6 189 x 6 189 x 6 189 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics. N represents the total number of firms in the dataset that the nearest 
neighbors are calculated from. All period of interest is represented. The residual (from the modified jones model) is 
calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. The residual is used as proxy to measure 
of accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table x.1.2. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, nn = 3, 
all industries and years together, only divided by period around the entry:  
 One year before 
entry 
Entry year One year after 
entry 
Two years after 
entry 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0621 0.127** 0.0810 0.0502 
 (0.148) (0.0424) (0.127) (0.151) 
N 189 x 4 189 x 4 189 x 4 189 x 4 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in the dataset that the nearest 
neighbors are calculated from. All period of interest is represented. The residual (from the modified jones model) is 
calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. The residual is used as proxy to measure 
of accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table x.1.3. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, one year 
before entry: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t=-1 t=-1 t=-1 t=-1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0588 -0.136 -0.0935* -0.0977 
 (0.0482) (0.216) (0.0369) (0.154) 
N 36 x 6 56 x 6 27 x 6 69 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table x.1.4. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, from the 
entry year: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0393 0.188 0.0395 -0.224 
 (0.0281) (0.670) (0.0317) (0.141) 
N 36 x 6 56 x 6 27 x 6 69 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table x.1.5. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, one year 
after entry: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0776 -0.0686 -0.00159 0.101 
 (0.0892) (0.198) (0.0392) (0.0623) 
N 36 x 6 56 x 6 27 x 6 69 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
Table x.1.6. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, two years 
after entry: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.118*** -0.314 -0.0615 0.246 
 (0.0173) (0.200) (0.0557) (0.215) 
N  36 x 6 56 x 6 27 x 6 69 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table x.1.7. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = -1, nn =5 
 2002 
Year 9 
2003 
Year 10 
2004 
Year 11 
2005 
Year 12 
 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.770** -2.577 -0.387 -0.0659 
 (0.295) (1.727) (1.096) (0.0707) 
N 9 x 6 10 x 6 10 x 6 9 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
Table x.1.8. Entry data by year for all industries together, t = -1, nn =5 
 2006 
Year 13 
2007 
Year 14 
2008 
Year 15 
2009 
Year 16 
 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.439 -0.840** 0.362 0.961 
 (0.448) (0.280) (0.336) (0.999) 
N 23 x 6 9 x 6 23 x 6 23 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table x.1.9. Entry data by year for all industries together, t = -1, nn =5 
 2010 
Year 17 
2011 
Year 18 
2012 
Year 19 
2013 
Year 20 
 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.489 0.237 -0.500*** -0.221* 
 (0.507) (0.747) (0.149) (0.0941) 
N 18 x 6 16 x 6 8 x 6 10 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
Table x.1.10. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = 0, nn =5 
 2002 
Year 9 
2003 
Year 10 
2004 
Year 11 
2005 
Year 12 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -1.031 -2.212 -0.0250 -0.265 
 (1.409) (1.817) (1.013) (0.218) 
N 9 x 6 10 x 6 10 x 6 9 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table x.1.11. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = 0, nn =5 
 2006 
Year 13 
2007 
Year 14 
2008 
Year 15 
2009 
Year 16 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.0673 0.284 0.290 0.238 
 (0.317) (0.533) (0.262) (0.162) 
N 23 x 6 9 x 6 23 x 6 23 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table x.1.12. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = 0, nn =5 
 2010 
Year 17 
2011 
Year 18 
2012 
Year 19 
2013 
Year 20 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0965 1.063 -0.172 0.0148 
 (0.0638) (0.660) (0.112) (0.0615) 
N 18 x 6 16 x 6 8 x 6 10 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table x.1.13. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = +1, nn =5 
 2002 
Year 9 
2003 
Year 10 
2004 
Year 11 
2005 
Year 12 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.386** -1.902 0.519 0.210 
 (0.149) (1.923) (1.032) (0.392) 
N 9 x 6 10 x 6 10 x 6 9 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table x.1.14. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = +1, nn =5 
 2006 
Year 
13 
2007 
Year 14 
2008 
Year 15 
2009 
Year 16 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.131 0.336 -0.0966 0.0126 
 (0.294) (0.619) (0.153) (0.174) 
N 23 x 6 9 x 6 23 x 6 23 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
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Table x.1.15. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = +1, nn =5 
 2010 
Year 17 
2011 
Year 18 
2012 
Year 19 
2013 
Year 20 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.0479 1.798* 0.508 -0.182 
 (0.292) (0.871) (0.376) (0.210) 
N 18 x 6 16 x 6 8 x 6 10 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table x.1.16. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = +2, nn =5 
 2002 
Year 9 
2003 
Year 10 
2004 
Year 11 
2005 
Year 12 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.239 -1.707 0.107 -0.563 
 (0.176) (1.844) (4.027) (0.294) 
N 9 x 6 10 x 6 10 x 6 9 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
Table x.1.17. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = +2, nn =5 
 2006 
Year 13 
2007 
Year 14 
2008 
Year 15 
2009 
Year 16 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.592 -0.00712 0.472 -0.298 
 (1.013) (0.0774) (0.275) (0.377) 
N 23 x 6 9 x 6 23 x 6 23 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
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Table x.1.18. Entry data by year, for all industries together, t = +2, nn =5 
 2010 
Year 17 
2011 
Year 18 
2012 
Year 19 
2013 
Year 20 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.248 1.901* 0.245 0.339 
 (0.589) (0.810) (0.231) (0.255) 
N 18 x 6 16 x 6 8 x 6 10 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
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APPENDIX Y  
 
EXIT DATA 
 
 
Table y.1.1. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, nn = 5, 
all industries and years together, only divided by period around the exit:  
 One year before 
exit 
Exit year One year after 
exit 
Two years after 
exit 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.102 0.0328 0.0328 -0.601 
 (0.182) (0.237) (0.203) (0.607) 
N 135 x 6 135 x 6 135 x 6 135 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in the dataset that the nearest 
neighbors (five nearest neighbors) are calculated from. All periods of interest are represented. The residuals (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. The residuals 
are used as proxy to measure of accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect 
on Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE effect on the portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in 
parentheses is the coefficients that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, 
negative or is none statistical different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table y.1.2. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, nn = 3, 
all industries and years together, only divided by period around the exit:  
 One year before 
exit 
Exit year One year after 
exit 
Two years after 
exit 
 t=-1 t=0 t=+1 t=+2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.285* -0.177 -0.183 -0.133 
 (0.123) (0.186) (0.149) (0.161) 
N 135 x 4 135 x 4 135 x 4 135 x 4 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in the dataset that the nearest 
neighbors (three nearest neighbors) are calculated from. All periods of interest are represented. The residuals (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. The residuals 
are used as proxy to measure of accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect 
on Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE effect on the portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in 
parentheses is the coefficients that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, 
negative or is none statistical different from their comparable companies.  
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Table y.1.3. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, one year 
before exit: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0588 -0.136 -0.0935* -0.0977 
 (0.0482) (0.216) (0.0369) (0.154) 
N 25 x 6 47 x 6 20 x 6 44 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
Table y.1.4. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, the exit 
year: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0393 0.188 0.0395 -0.224 
 (0.0281) (0.670) (0.0317) (0.141) 
N 25 x 6 47 x 6 20 x 6 44 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table y.1.5. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, one year 
after exit: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0776 -0.0686 -0.00159 0.101 
 (0.0892) (0.198) (0.0392) (0.0623) 
N  25 x 6 47 x 6 20 x 6 44 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table y.1.6. Residuals (AEM) for portfolio companies and comparable companies, two years 
after exit: nn =5 
 Industry 4 Industry 5 Industry 8 Industry 10 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.118*** -0.314 -0.0615 0.246 
 (0.0173) (0.200) (0.0557) (0.215) 
N  25 x 6 47 x 6 20 x 6 44 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Industry 4) that 
the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from the 
modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual is 
used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table y.1.7. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = -1, nn =5 
 1998 
Year 2 
2002 
Year 6 
2004 
Year 8 
2005 
Year 9 
 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.359 -1.479 0.0743 1.154 
 (0.449) (1.340) (0.0723) (0.872) 
N 5 x 6 8 x 6 16 x 6 7 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table y.1.8. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = -1, nn =5 
 2006 
Year 10 
2007 
Year 11 
2008 
Year 12 
2009 
Year 13 
 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.224 0.0646 -0.304 -0.231 
 (0.189) (0.0425) (0.342) (0.166) 
N 17 x 6 7 x 6 7 x 6 5 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
Table y.1.9. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = -1, nn =5 
 2010 
Year 14 
2011 
Year 15 
2012 
Year 16 
2013 
Year 17 
 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 t = -1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.533 -0.0883 -0.319** -0.0370 
 (0.369) (0.0985) (0.109) (0.0850) 
N 15 x 6 10 x 6 14 x 6 15 x 6 
     
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=-1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table y.1.10. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = 0, nn =5 
 1998 
Year 2 
2002 
Year 6 
2004 
Year 8 
2005 
Year 9 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -1.407 0.248 -0.0871 -0.461 
 (1.175) (0.210) (0.0539) (0.457) 
N  5 x 6 8 x 6 16 x 6 7 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table y.1.11. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = 0, nn =5 
 2006 
Year 10 
2007 
Year 11 
2008 
Year 12 
2009 
Year 13 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.763 -0.225** 0.178 0.0322 
 (0.695) (0.0816) (0.192) (0.294) 
N 
  
17 x 6 7 x 6 7 x 6 5 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
 
 
Table y.1.12. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = 0, nn =5 
 2010 
Year 14 
2011 
Year 15 
2012 
Year 16 
2013 
Year 17 
 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 1.458 -0.134 -0.125 0.135*** 
 (1.809) (0.215) (0.135) (0.0372) 
N  15 x 6 10 x 6 14 x 6 15 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=0 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual (from 
the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This residual 
is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients that is the 
result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical different from 
their comparable companies.  
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Table y.1.13. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = +1, nn =5 
 1998 
Year 2 
2002 
Year 6 
2004 
Year 8 
2005 
Year 9 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.889 0.505 0.0596 -0.702 
 (0.607) (0.301) (0.0590) (0.553) 
N 
  
5 x 6 8 x 6 16 x 6 7 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
 
Table y.1.14. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = +1, nn =5 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2006 
Year 10 
2007 
Year 11 
2008 
Year 12 
2009 
Year 13 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.325 0.212 -0.0314 0.576 
 (0.210) (0.148) (0.125) (0.398) 
N 
  
17 x 6 7 x 6 7 x 6 5 x 6 
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Table y.1.15. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = +1, nn =5 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+1 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
Table y.1.16. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = +2, nn =5 
 1998 
Year 2 
2002 
Year 6 
2004 
Year 8 
2005 
Year 9 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 3.207 0.461 0.131 -0.676 
 (3.100) (0.462) (0.109) (0.482) 
N  5 x 6 8 x 6 16 x 6 7 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2010 
Year 14 
2011 
Year 15 
2012 
Year 16 
2013 
Year 17 
 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 t = +1 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.251 0.320 0.0230 -0.0718 
 (0.477) (0.219) (0.104) (0.0606) 
N 
  
15 x 6 10 x 6 14 x 6 15 x 6 
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Table y.1.17. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = +2, nn =5 
 2006 
Year 10 
2007 
Year 11 
2008 
Year 12 
2009 
Year 13 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout 0.0107 -0.0479 0.104 -0.658 
 (0.215) (0.0603) (0.105) (0.405) 
N 
  
17 x 6 7 x 6 7 x 6 5 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
 
 
 
 
Table y.1.18. Exit data by year, for all industries together, t = +2, nn =5 
 2010 
Year 14 
2011 
Year 15 
2012 
Year 16 
2013 
Year 17 
 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 t = +2 
ATET     
r1vs0.buyout -0.374 -0.0817 -0.246 -0.190 
 (0.473) (0.163) (0.335) (0.103) 
N 
  
15 x 6 10 x 6 14 x 6 15 x 6 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
All matches done at t-1 for firm characteristics.  N represents the total number of firms in that segment (ex. Entries in year 
2004) that the nearest neighbors are calculated from. t=+2 is the period of interest, it is also the period that the residual 
(from the modified jones model) is calculated for each firm in the dataset, with the fixed effect panel data regression. This 
residual is used as proxy to measure accrual earnings management. Where it is used to calculate the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATET), which is the PE portfolio companies. The numbers that is not in parentheses is the coefficients 
that is the result from the teffects PSM calculation, which tells us if the effect is positive, negative or is none statistical 
different from their comparable companies.  
